Parcel to parcel linkage : who benefits from the redistribution of wealth? by Hum, Tarry
PARCEL TO PARCEL LINKAGE:
WHO BENEFITS FROM THE REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH?
by
Tarry Hum
B.A., Hampshire College
(1983)
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
DEGREE OF
MASTER OF CITY PLANNING
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF URBAN STUDIES AND PLANNING
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
JUNE, 1987
(c) Tarry Hum 1987
The author hereby grants to M.I.T. permission to reproduce and
to distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in
part.
Signature of Author
Certified by
Depa e t-of Urban Studi and Planning
May 7, 1987
SEdw Meldndez, PhD
T. sis Supervisor
Accepted by 'I.,-"I-
A hillip L. Clay PhD
Chairperson, Master of Ci4 Planning Commttee
RomiMASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTEOF TECHNOLOGY
JUN 0 R 1987
LIBRARIES
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
Abstract
Introduction
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
A Theoretical Synthesis
Labor Market Segmentation
Internal Colonialism
A Theory of Displacement
A Theoretical Synthesis of the
Parcel to Parcel Linkage Project
Parcel to Parcel Linkage Project
Parcel to Parcel Linkage
Financing Parcel to Parcel Linkage
Guidelines for Community Benefits
Parcel to Parcel Linkage: Advancing
Minority Capitalism?
Conclusion
Socioeconomic Profile of Chinatown
Methodology
Distribution of Boston Asian Population
Concentration of Immigrants
Educational Level
Labor Force Participation
Occupational Status
Place of Work
Income
Conclusion
The Impact of the Economic Restructuring of
Boston on the Chinatown Labor Force
Economic Trends
Economic Restructuring and Job Opportunities
Parcel to Parcel Linkage Job Creation and
Impact on Chinatown Workers
Parcel to Parcel Linkage Job Creation and
Human Capital Theory
Conclusion
Strategies for Redistributing Wealth
Training
Strategies for Redistributing Wealth
Unions
Workers Cooperatives
Redistributing Wealth for Community Control
Conclusion
1
8
10
15
19
25
30
31
36
38
43
51
53
54
55
56
56
58
59
61
62
63
65
66
71
76
82
85
89
91
94
95
98
102
107
Table of Contents
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D
Appendix E
Appendix F
Appendix G
Appendix H
Bibliography
Advertisement for Roxbury Condominiums
Description of 9 Knapp Street Development
BRA Pin-Wheel Diagram
Minority Development Team Members
Summary of Minority Development Team
Proposals
Tables for Socioeconomic Profile of
Chinatown
List of Boston's Twenty-Two Fastest
Growing Occupations
Articles on the P & L Garment Workers
112
114
117
119
131
136
150
152
156
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This study was an endeavor in which many individuals
contributed to with their encouragment and advice. First, I
would like to acknowledge the members of my thesis committee,
Professor Edwin Meldndez for his respect and dedication to
students and their learning process, Professors Mel King and
Tunney Lee, and Ms. Carol Lee whose criticism and support, even
in light of dissenting perspectives, were invaluable.
The ideas expressed in this thesis owe much to the work of
Professors Marie Kennedy and the late Mauricio Gast6n.
Additionally, I would like to thank Marie Kennedy and Chris
Tilly for their enthusiasm and important feedback on early
drafts.
Much appreciation extends to MIT friends which include my
thesis support group, Jenny Amory, Susan Matteucci and Becky
Stevens. Also, to Ms. Carla Aldnso for her insightful advice
and support.
And last, but not least, to Robert Sanborn who endured the
thesis process with much patience and understanding. Thank you
for reading endless drafts, offering comments which helped
refine my thinking, and tolerating the dominance of parcel to
parcel linkage discussions for the past several months.
PARCEL TO PARCEL LINKAGE:
WHO BENEFITS FROM THE REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH?
by
Tarry Hum
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on May 7, 1987 in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of
Master in City Planning
ABSTRACT
Parcel to parcel linkage is a land disposition policy which
links the designation and development of a 'desirable' publicly
owned parcel of land with a 'less desirable' publicly owned
parcel of land. In July of 1985, this policy was formally
adopted by the city of Boston initiating a 400 million dollar
project.
The parcel to parcel linkage project links the Kingston-Bedford
and Essex Street sites located in the financial district which
borders Chinatown with Parcel 18 in Roxbury. The development
plans for the linked sites are dominated by the construction of
high rise office towers and hotels. The city administration
has upheld the parcel to parcel linkage project as an
innovative approach to community economic development which
promises to redistribute downtown wealth to historically
disinvested communities. The primary strategies to
"redistribute" wealth are minority ownership and participation,
office tower based job creation, linkage fee funded job
retraining and construction of affordable housing.
The parcel to parcel linkage project reflects the economic
restructuring which the Boston economy is currently undergoing.
High rise office towers will accommodate Boston's growing
service economy. The economic trends facing Boston are
discussed with a particular focus on their potential impact on
the labor force participation of Chinatown workers. Within a
theoretical paradigm of segmented labor markets, internal
colonialism and displacement, this thesis examines the
effectiveness of the parcel to parcel linkage strategies to
redistribute wealth.
Through a detailed analysis of the parcel to parcel linkage job
creation agenda and the socioeconomic characteristics of
Chinatown residents based on 1980 census data, this thesis
concludes that the parcel to parcel linkage project will not
substantially improve the socioeconomic status of community
residents. Two supplementary strategies: unions and workers
cooperatives, are proposed as efforts to contribute toward
community-based institution building and thus, begin a true
process of redistributing wealth.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Edwin Melendez
Title: Assistant Professor
INTRODUCTION
The details of a 400 million dollar development project
which promises to redistribute downtown Boston wealth to two
historically disinvested local communities, Chinatown and
Roxbury, are nearing completion. This project, the first
parcel to parcel linkage project in Boston, is gaining much
attention as an innovative approach to community economic
development. In July of 1985, an agreement was signed by the
city, state and Parcel 18 Task Force which formalized the
parcel to parcel linkage project and established the Boston
Redevelopment Authority (BRA) as the development agent to
coordinate the development process.
Parcel to parcel linkage formally "links" two publicly owned
sites to be developed as interdependent parts of one project.
This concept establishes the linkage of a 'desirable' publicly
owned parcel of land, i.e., a downtown site which has little
trouble attracting private investment, with a 'less desirable'
parcel of land, e.g., land in historically disinvested
communities. The developer, or development team, who is
designated to build on the downtown site is then also required
to develop the 'less desirable' site. The role of the public
sector is not only to link and dispose of the parcels but to
allocate public funds to ensure the financial feasibility of
the linkage project.
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The first parcel to parcel linkage project links the
Kingston-Bedford and Essex Street sites in the financial
district which borders Chinatown with Parcel 18 in Roxbury.
Parcel 18, a 5.6 acre vacant lot situated near the MBTA Ruggles
Street Station and Tremont Street, is to be developed into
competitively priced "back office" space. The availability of
cheap vacant land in Roxbury and its proximity to downtown
Boston make Parcel 18 a prime location for this kind of
development. The downtown sites, Kingston-Bedford, a 750 car
parking garage, and Essex Street, a 78 car parking lot, are to
be developed into a 40 story executive (Class A) office tower
and a 350 room hotel, respectively.
The parcel to parcel linkage project is evidence of the
economic transformation which Boston is currently undergoing.
Within the past few years, Boston has rapidly progressed toward
becoming a "global city". The Boston economy is shifting from
a manufacturing based economy to a service based economy. This
economic restructuring demands spatial reorganization and
creates new forms of labor participation. The parcel to parcel
linkage project embodies the following tendencies of the Boston
economic transformation; the need to expand and centralize
economic activity in the central business district, the
physical upgrading of the urban environment and the substantial
decline in manufacturing jobs accompanied by an upsurge in
service sector -employment opportunities. In other words, the
parcel to parcel linkage project indicates how local
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communities will be impacted by the growth of the Boston
central business district.
The parcel to parcel linkage project is based on the premise
that "wealth" can be shared by encouraging private investment
through office development in Chinatown and Roxbury. Office
towers will revitalize neighborhood economies by creating jobs.
The job linkage fees to be generated by the parcel to parcel
linkage projects will prepare community residents to access
these new jobs. In addition, the housing linkage fees will
contribute toward the construction of much needed affordable
housing. As a result, Roxbury will be "enfranchised" again and
securely "tied into the conveyor belt of the city's expanding
opportunity" and Chinatown will "strengthen and enlarge (its)
unique existing economy". (BRA, 1986) In sum, all
participants have much to gain from parcel to parcel linkage.
As boldly stated in a BRA report (1986), "(i)n the larger
sense, Boston would come out a winner with balanced growth -
the channeling of the benefits of downtown development to
revitalize a neglected Roxbury and a deprived Chinatown." (BRA,
1986)
The success of parcel to parcel linkage is critical to the
Flynn administration. Mayor Flynn who ran on a platform
grounded in commitment to rebuilding Boston's neighborhoods has
upheld this project as possibly the most important contribution
to community economic development. Parcel to parcel linkage is
a model of a public-private partnership intended to balance
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economic growth and fulfill public policy objectives through
directing private investment and the creative applications of
public sector funds and legislation. The parcel to parcel
linkage seeks to address the stark disparity between the
vitality of the downtown Boston economy and the poverty which
still plagues some inner city communities. Its objective is to
"bring the benefits of growth to people in need" and leverage
for the maximum benefits or concessions from private
development. In short, the approach of the parcel to parcel
linkage in addressing economic injustice and uneven development
is to facilitate the "trickle down" process.
The parcel to parcel linkage project proposes that the
extension of the downtown economy in Chinatown and Roxbury will
revitalize their neighborhood economies. Job retraining will
enable community residents to become active participants in the
emerging service economy. These projections, however, reflect
certain assumptions about the development process and the
nature of service sector employment. An outstanding assumption
is that displacement will not occur, therefore, all community
residents stand to gain from the parcel to parcel linkage
project. The jobs that will be created by office and hotel
development are "good" jobs which will increase incomes.
Further, it is assumed that community residents can readily
access these jobs. The overall underlying message is that
residents will remain and benefit from the flood of private
capital which will transform their communities.
4
This study proposes that the primary objective of the parcel
to parcel linkage project is not the "redistribution of wealth"
in a manner which will truly benefit Chinatown and Roxbury,
but, in fact, the facilitation and centralization of the
spatial and economic expansion of the downtown economy. The
planned developments will accommodate Boston's growing service
industries. Furthermore, the parcel to parcel linkage project
redefines how inner city communities will continue to service
the needs of private capital and the central business district.
The economic restructuring of Boston will indeed transform the
economic and social functions of Chinatown and Roxbury,
however, very little wealth will be redistributed.
While the analysis of this study is often applicable to both
Chinatown and Roxbury, the focus of this study will be the
potential impact of the parcel to parcel linkage project on the
Chinatown community. This study will examine job creation and
retraining as the proposed strategies to share downtown wealth
with Chinatown. The nature of service sector jobs and the
potential impact of these jobs on the socioeconomic status of
community residents will be explored. Essentially, this study
will discuss the effectiveness of the parcel to parcel linkage
project approach to fulfilling its self-proclaimed objective to
"share wealth" with Chinatown and Roxbury. In sum, the
question which guides this inquiry is who benefits from the
parcel to parcel linkage project?
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Chapter I lays out a theoretical framework which provides a
political, social and economic context in which to evaluate the
parcel to parcel linkage project. This paradigm incorporates
labor market segmentation theory, internal colonialism and a
theory of displacement and provides the necessary tools to
analyze the assumptions and objectives of the parcel to parcel
linkage project.
Chapter II outlines the details of the parcel to parcel
linkage project, the financing and allocation of community
benefits. This chapter will discuss the role of the minority
development team as the mechanism for community control over
development.
Chapter III provides a socioeconomic profile of Chinatown
residents based on 1980 census data. This chapter assesses the
secondary labor market status of Chinatown workers in order to
project if these workers can successfully make the transition
from current employment to service sector jobs.
Chapter IV discusses Boston's emerging service based economy
and examines the nature of service sector employment. The
parcel to parcel linkage job creation agenda which emphasizes
retraining as the strategy to prepare Chinatown workers to
obtain these new jobs is also discussed. This chapter assesses
how the parcel to parcel linkage project impacts the secondary
labor market status of community workers.
Chapter V explores two supplementary strategies which will
initiate the true redistribution of wealth: unions and workers
6
cooperatives. Chapter V analyzes how these institutions can
contribute to a process of redistributing wealth for community
control.
7
CHAPTER I
A THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS
INTRODUCTION
Chinatown and Roxbury share prominent features that reflect
their position in the Greater Boston economy and which also
predetermine a vulnerability to displacement. Most notably,
both Chinatown and Roxbury are low-income communities of color.
Equally important is their proximity to the central business
district; Chinatown is located on the periphery of the
financial district and Roxbury is only three miles from the
center of Boston. While Roxbury occupies a substantially
larger area of land than Chinatown, of which a significant
amount is vacant, land tenure is comparable in that
homeownership is low in both communities. Affordable housing
is a pressing concern and the existing housing stock is mostly
old and in need of repair.
Community residents are primarily employed in secondary
labor market jobs which are low wage and lack security. Both
communities service the Boston economy by supplying low skill
workers or as in the case of many Roxbury residents, the
reserve army of laborers. Unemployment is a serious problem in
Roxbury and a growing concern for Chinatown as increasing
numbers of workers are displaced from declining manufacturing
industries such as the garment industry. In sum, Chinatown and
Roxbury share a common economic and social relation to Boston.
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The parcel to parcel linkage project has formally linked
these two communities in an attempt to revitalize them by
initiating substantial private reinvestment. The following
chapter will provide the theoretical framework or paradigm
within which to examine the objectives of the parcel to parcel
linkage project. Of particular interest are those objectives:
affordable housing, job creation and community control of
development, highlighted by the BRA as strategies to
reintegrate Chinatown and Roxbury with the Boston economy.
In order to discuss the soundness of the parcel to parcel
linkage approach to community economic development, it is
necessary to synthesize a theory of labor markets with a theory
of urban spatial organization which includes an understanding
of displacement. This theoretical framework is critical since
it will provide the broader social, political and economic
context to analyze the parcel to parcel linkage approaches to
rebuilding the neighborhood economies of Chinatown and Roxbury.
The parcel to parcel linkage plan essentially outlines a
method to restructure the labor markets and spatial
organization of Chinatown and Roxbury. Therefore, it is
imperative that we examine carefully the specific roles these
communities currently perform for the Boston economy. An
analysis based on theories of labor market segmentation,
internal colonialism, and displacement will provide a framework
which will evaluate the effectiveness of the parcel to parcel
linkage project in addressing the structural barriers presently
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faced by these communities. Furthermore, as Chinatown and
Roxbury are low-income communities of color, this framework
must integrate an understanding of the centrality of racism in
shaping the labor market participation and general quality of
life of these community residents.
IABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION
The participation of people of color in the Boston economy
is characteristically in low wage, low skill jobs. Many
theories persist which argue that poor people of color lack the
necessary skills, education, cultural values and behavior which
permit them to access stable, high wage employment. These
theories focus on the inadequacies of the labor force or in
other words, the supply side of the labor market. Ultimately,
these theories "blame the victims" for their misfortune and
neglect to recognize how institutionalized barriers prevent
people of color from gaining entry to certain types of
employment.
Labor market segmentation theory as developed most recently
by political economists David Gordon, Michael Reich and Richard
Edwards among others, offers quite a different perspective on
the operation of the labor market. Labor market segmentation
theory incorporates concepts of labor control and heightened
worker divisions in understanding how and why the labor force
is stratified. Labor market segmentation theory describes the
labor market as divided into two distinct markets in which
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intermarket mobility is constrained, particularly, upward
mobility. Each distinct labor market operates according to a
different recruitment process and produce different outcomes.
The two labor market segments are identified as the
secondary labor market and the primary market which is
subdivided into the subordinate primary market and the
independent primary market. Each segment contains
approximately 1/4 to 1/3 of the labor force and is more or less
of equal size on the national level. (Edwards, 1979: 166)
These labor market segments are distinguished from each other
with respect to employment stability, wage scales, job security
and benefits, importance of education and training, and the
significance of seniority (job tenure) and work experience.
More importantly, the concept of labor control is central to
the labor market segmentation theory. As Edwards contend,
Labor markets are segmented because they express a
historical segmentation of the labor process; specifically
a distinct system of control inside the firm underlies each
of the three market segments. (Edwards, 1979: 178)
Essentially, labor is organized and controlled differently
within each of the segments. Simple control is used in the
secondary labor market, technical control in the subordinate
primary market and bureaucratic control in the independent
primary market.
The secondary labor market is characterized by low skill,
low wage jobs that lack security and benefits. Secondary labor
market jobs do not require training or education beyond basic
literacy, if that at all. They are typically "dead-end" jobs
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with no prospects for advancement or wage increases. As
Edwards describes, "The only thing that a worker brings to a
secondary job is labor power; the worker is treated and paid
accordingly." (Edwards, 1979: 167) Since secondary labor
market jobs require almost no skills, workers are easily
replaced and in fact, are probably most exploitable as wages
and worker militancy are further suppressed by the threat of
dismissal. The mechanism for controlling the work performance
and behavior of secondary workers is simple control. Simple
control entails "the arbitrary power of foremen and supervisors
to direct work, to monitor performance, and to discipline or
reward workers." (Edwards, 1979: 183)
A further characterization of the secondary labor market is
high turnover among workers. Bennett Harrison in his book,
Education, Training and the Urban Ghetto (1972) offers an
explanation,
The lack of economic power which characterizes peripheral
firms (as reflected, for example, in the relatively high
elasticity of their output demand curves) also makes it
impossible for them to raise wages and other input costs
without eroding profit margins, often to the shutdown
point. (Harrison, 1972: 132)
In fact, Harrison notes,
With minimal investment in their current labor force,
and given the readily availability of substitute labor
outside the firms, such employers are at the very least
indifferent to the rate of turnover. (emphasis added)
(Harrison, 1972: 133)
Secondary labor market jobs include production and
nonproduction (service) work. Secondary labor market jobs in
production or manufacturing are typically in industries
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characterized by "(a) low concentration ratio, a high amount of
price competition and a labor-intensive production technique",
for example, the garment and cannery industries. (Malveaux,
1984: 108) Such service jobs as janitors, waiters/waitresses,
hospital orderlies, delivery people, and guards are typically
secondary labor market jobs. Lower-level positions in retail-
wholesale trade such as sales clerks, check out clerks,
inventory stockers and clerical jobs including typing, filing,
and key punching are also secondary jobs.
Unlike the secondary labor market, subordinate primary
market jobs are characterized by job security, higher wages,
stability, on the job training, and an internal labor market
which is a feature of all primary labor market jobs. The
presence of an internal labor market is an important feature of
job stability since it indicates an avenue for job advancement
and mobility. As defined by Edwards (1979), an internal labor
market is "a set of procedures contained wholly within the firm
for performing the functions of the external market: the
allocation and pricing of labor." (Edwards, 1979: 180)
Subordinate primary market jobs also include both
production and nonproduction work. Typically, subordinate
primary market production jobs are characterized as jobs of the
"old industrial working class", i.e., mass-production
manufacturing in the auto, electrical products, machinery, and
consumer product assembly industries. Subordinate primary
market nonproduction workers include unionized workers in
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lower-level sales, clerical and adminstration. Unionization is
a prominent characteristic of the subordinate primary labor
market and account for the presence of internal labor markets
in these jobs. Therefore, unlike secondary market workers,
subordinate primary market workers are to a certain degree
insulated from unemployment.
Another distinction between secondary and subordinate
primary market jobs is that some subordinate primary market
jobs, as all primary market jobs, cultivate an identification
with one's job. This worker consciousness reflects in part,
the dominance of well-defined occupations. As Edwards notes,
"A worker laid off at the auto plants remains an (unemployed)
auto worker, rather than simply joining the ranks of the
anonymous unemployed." (Edwards, 1979: 173) However, unlike
primary market jobs, subordinate primary market work is
typically repetitious, routine, and subject to machine pacing
which describes the nature of technical control. In effect,
workers exert very little control over their jobs. (Edwards,
1979: 171).
Independent primary market jobs are characterized by
general rather than firm-specific skills obtained through years
of advanced or specialized education. These jobs maintain
standards of professional work behavior and attitudes.
Independent primary market jobs typically require self-
initiative and pacing. Professional, managerial, technical and
administrative occupations are characteristically primary
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market jobs. Needless to say, these jobs are high-paying,
stable, secure, have internal labor markets and demand
educational credentials. The system of control employed in the
independent primary market is bureaucratic control which
establishes and enforces work behavior through opportunities
for job advancement and a prevailing adherence to
"professional" norms and standards.
INTERNAL COLONIALISM
Labor market segmentation theory is critical for our
framework because it provides an analysis which highlights how
the labor market is structured as two distinct and enduring
factions characterized by differences in such job features as
wages, security, nature of work, stability, benefits, the
importance of education and training. Labor market
segmentation theory incorporates how capitalist control over
labor shapes the labor market and institutionalizes worker
divisions. However, as Edwards recognizes, "The different
systems of control are not the only force pushing toward labor
segmentation, but they surely are one of the most important."
(Edwards, 1979: 183) This assertion was then footnoted. The
footnote stated,
Other sources are racism and sexism, the conscious efforts
of employers to split the working class, and more diverse
"cultural" factors involving family structure and
schooling. (emphasis added) (Edwards, 1979: 240)
It is precisely the institutionalization of the racial division
of labor which is central to our analysis of labor market
15
segmentation. Our theoretical framework needs to address how
the implicit role of racism determines which workers are
relegated to the labor market segments. Mario Barrera, author
of Race and Class in the Southwest (1979) correctly notes that
the limitations of labor market segmentation theory is that it
"stress(es) segmentation based on the structure of occupation"
while "the dimensions of racial and sexual labor market
division have largely remained theoretically unintegrated..."
(Barrera, 1979: 210)
The lack of a race and sex analysis in labor market
segmentation theory undercuts its potential as a comprehensive
theory of labor markets in a capitalist society. Barrera
contends that labor market segmentation theory presents
(T)he divisions based on the structure of occupations
(as) racially and sexually neutral, and presumably,
they would exist in a capitalist economy even if the
workforce were entirely homogenous racially and
sexually. (Barrera, 1979: 211)
Incorporating how racism (and sexism) shapes the control over
labor and subsequently, employment opportunities and job
characteristics of all workers is critical for understanding
the nature of work and worker divisions in the United States.
In fact, as Harold M. Baron and Bennett Hymer argue in their
article, "Racial Dualism in an Urban Labor Market" (
The marked and systematic disparities that exist
between whites and Negroes in regard to income,
employment, occupations, and labor force participation
offer prima facie evidence that a dual racial labor
market exists. (Baron and Hymer, :190)
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By recognizing the centrality of racism and sexism in
determining the dynamics of capitalist social relations,
Barrera proposes a model of labor market segmentation which
integrates a theory of internal colonialism. Internal
colonialism has been advocated as a theory which describes the
political, social and economic status of people of color in the
United States. The analogy rests with the international
relationship between Third World countries - the periphery -
and the First World Countries - the core. 1 The nature of this
relationship is characterized by First World exploitation and
domination of the Third World.2 Barrera explains,
Colonialism is a structured relationship of domination
and subordination, where the dominant and subordinate
groups are defined along ethnic and/or racial lines,
and where the relationship is established and maintained
to serve the interests of all or part of the dominant
group. (Barrera, 1979: 193)
Internal colonialism addresses the oppression of people of
color in the U.S. within a similar framework of international
relations. This relationship is characterized by exploitation
and domination as the "First World" or core expropriates
resources and labor power from the periphery. However, unlike
the international sphere where Third World and First World
1 Refer to Robert Blauner's article "Colonized and Immigrant
Minorities" in Yetman, Maiority and Minority, pp. 302-317 and
William Tabb's The Political Economy of The Black Ghetto, pp. 21-
35.
2 Refer to Andre Gunder Frank's article, "The Development of
Underdevelopment," in R.I. Rhodes, ed., Imperialism and
Underdevelopment (N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1970).
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nations are located in distinct geographical areas, internal
colonialism is "a form of colonialism in which the dominant and
subordinate populations are intermingled". (Barrera, 1979: 194)
Barrera (1979) then notes that unlike colonialism, internal
colonialism is not geographically distinctive. However, many
urban geographers and others will contend that in fact, there
are visible geographical areas which serve as a "metropolis"
that is vastly different and distinct from those areas which
are "colony".
Barrera's (1979) model integrates the concept of a racial
division of labor with labor market segmentation theory and
suggests that two major types of intraclass divisions exist in
a capitalist economy. Each of the major divisions are then
further subdivided. The two major intraclass divisions are
referred to as class segments and are defined as Type 1 -
"structural class segments" - divisions based on the structure
of occupations which is basically the proposition of labor
market segmentation theory, and Type 2 - "ascriptive class
segments" - divisions based on the ascribed characteristics of
people, primarily their race/ethnicity and gender. Barrera
(1979) contends,
An ascriptive class segment is a portion of a class
which is set off from the rest of the class by some
readily identifiable and relatively stable
characteristic of the persons assigned to that segment,
such as race, ethnicity or sex, where the relationships
of the members to the means and process of production is
affected by that demarcation. (Barrera, 1979: 212)
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The role of racism and sexism in further defining class
consciousness and divisions and more importantly, labor force
participation is noted by David Gordon in his book, Theories of
Poverty and Underemployment (1972),
According to nearly every version of the (labor market
segmentation) theory, finally, race and sex will probably
serve as fairly accurate predictors of inter-sectoral
allocation as workers enter the market. (Gordon, 1972: 50)
In sum, internal colonialism furthers the understanding of how
labor markets function in capitalist society. Labor market
segmentation theory proposes that the labor market is organized
into two distinct segments defined by stability, wages,
benefits, nature of work and supervision, work behavior,
importance of education and training. To supplement this
observation with the acknowledgement that the labor force is
further divided by race and sex, will provide a comprehensive
approach to not only begin to define the disunity among all
workers but more importantly, to explain how racism serves to
concentrate people of color in typically "dead-end" jobs.
A THEORY OF DISPIACEMENT
The parcel to parcel linkage project encapsulates the type
of economic growth Boston is currently experiencing. The
economic restructuring of the Boston economy is accompanied by
a need for spatial expansion and centralization of the service
economy. The parcel to parcel linkage project, centered
primarily around the construction of high rise office towers,
will accommodate Boston's expanding financial and
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administrative activities. This project demonstrates how
"(p)ublic development policies must change to meet the changed
realities of the city's growth economy." (BRA, 1986: 10) Neil
Smith in his article, "Gentrification, the Frontier, and the
Restructuring of Urban Space", (1986) identified the trends
which are responsible for and shape the form of urban
restructuring. He lists the following processes:
a) suburbanization and the emergence of rent gap
b) the deindustrialization of advanced capitalist economies
and growth of white collar employment
c) the spatial centralization and simultaneous
decentralization of capital
d) the falling rate of profit and the cyclical movement of
capital
e) demographic changes and changes in consumption process
(Smith, 1986: 22)
These trends indicate how the spatial design and organization
of an urban area is determined, in part, by the economic
function it serves. For the past few years, Boston has been
experiencing a shift in its economic base from manufacturing to
service industries. This economic restructuring in turn
facilitates a spatial reorganization most visibility noted by
empty factories and warehouses and the emerging dominance of
high rise office towers. As Smith (1986) observes,
A given built environment expresses specific patterns of
production and reproduction, consumption and circulation,
and as these patterns change, so does the geographical
patterning of the built environment. (Smith, 1986: 21)
The drive to agglomerate economic activity in the downtown
Boston area is threatening the viability of its neighboring
communities, particularly Chinatown and Roxbury. Chinatown
will be directly impacted by the presence of a 40 story office
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tower while Roxbury is wholly incorporated into the effort to
centralize the expanding economic activity in the downtown
area. The planned development of "back office" space for
Parcel 18 clearly represents this drive to maintain service
sector growth within the central area of downtown Boston.
Smith (1986) predicts that the future of such an urban
center will be dominated by professional/managerial, financial,
and administrative functions. The residents will be primarily
middle to upper middle class. Such commercial developments as
restaurants, hotels, boutiques and cultural centers, e.g.,
theatres, will emerge to cater to an upper middle class life
style. In sum, the phenomenon of "Manhattanization" will be
played out. This process has already begun with full force in
Boston as evidenced by the frequent media releases which
describe yet another rehabilitation plan for downtown Boston.
On January 25, 1986, a Boston Globe article, "Combat Zone at
Crossroads", reported the increased development and speculation
activity in the area. Only two days later, an article appeared
in the Boston Tab, "At Center Stage", which described a city
plan to develop a midtown/cultural district (which incidentally
includes the Kingston-Bedford/Essex Street development).
Theories on why displacement occur range from theories
which emphasize consumer preference: returning suburbanites who
desire the cultural diversity of inner city neighborhoods and
the proximity to work, to theories which highlight variations
of the economics of supply and demand indicating a general
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housing crisis. Other theories as advocated by Anthony Downs
of the Brookings Institute contend that displacement is due to
disparities in individual purchasing power. Downs writes,
In reality, displacement is the result of large disparities
in purchasing power in a free-enterprise economy, plus
occasional shortages of adequate housing in specific
markets. (Downs, - )
However, many academics and community activists argue that the
'returning gentry' or consumer preference theory of
displacement is overstated and fails to identify the catalyst
of the gentrification process. Based on Smith's (1979)
research on the gentrification of Society Hill in Philadelphia,
he concludes,
the gentrifier as consumer is only one of the many actors
participating in the process. To explain gentrification
according to the gentrifiers action alone, while ignoring
the role of builders, developers, landlords, mortgage
lenders, government agencies, real estate agents and
tenants, is excessively narrow. (Smith, 1979: 540)
Professors Mauricio Gaston and Marie Kennedy expand on Smith's
argument and contend that disinvestment and reinvestment are
merely phases of the same process. (Gaston and Kennedy, 1985:2)
They observe that the current "investment wave" which threatens
the viability of many low-income inner city communities of
color indicates a transition from economic crisis which entails
(p)ainful population migrations, changes in the pattern of
investments in the cities, and different policies
formulated by both private capital and the state aimed at
overcoming the crisis and ushering in newer forms of
accumulation and new urban order. (Gaston and Kennedy,
1985: 4)
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The problem of displacement centers around people and land,
or in other words, residents and their homes and communities.
Within a capitalist society, the housing, construction and
banking industries are powerful mainstay institutions of the
national economy. Housing and land are commodities which have
a value and when a disparity exists in the value of the land's
current use (capitalized ground rent) and its potential use
(potential ground rent) then displacement is imminent. Smith
has identified this disparity as the rent gap. He contends,
Only when this gap emerges can redevelopment be expected
since if the present use succeeded in capitalizing all or
most of the ground rent, little economic benefit could be
derived from redevelopment. (Smith, 1979: 545)
Increases in land value are caused in part by real estate
speculation, anticipated development, location (proximity to
central business district or other recently gentrified
neighborhood) and scarcity of land. Essentially, Smith's
important lesson on displacement is that one needs to take into
account the role of producers (developers and bankers) as well
as consumers because "it appears that the needs of production -
in particular the need to earn profit - are a more decisive
initiative behind gentrification than a consumer preference."
(Smith, 1979: 540)
Moreover, Gaston and Kennedy (1985) argue that
institutionalized racism is an inherent factor in the
historical development of urban areas which contributes to the
vulnerability of low income communities of color to
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displacement. They write,
It (racism) is a central determinant of the condition of
life for neighborhoods like Roxbury, permeating every
aspect of their economy, demographic structure,
institutional environment, political situation. It created
the ghetto, and rendered its occupants vulnerable to the
abuses of the market and the state. (emphasis added)
(Gaston and Kennedy, 1985: 41)
In sum, consumer preference is a small, if at all significant,
factor in the gentrification and displacement process. Market
demands and the real estate industry are the big players which
comprise the force behind gentrification and displacement.
Furthermore, Gaston and Kennedy (1985) accurately point out
that racism, in part, will determine who is particularly
vulnerable to displacement.
Displacement has been rationalized as the "social cost of
the reinvestment process". The coercive and disruptive nature
of displacement is deflected by such benign terms as
'neighborhood change', 'neighborhood resettlement',
'neighborhood renewal', 'dislocation', 'relocation',
'upgrading', 'recycling of inner city neighborhoods.' These
phrases do not reflect the conclusions of many displacement
studies which indicate that those who are most vulnerable to
displacement are the poor, the elderly and people of color. In
effect, the language which dominate the literature on
displacement ignores the political and economic reality of
vulnerability and powerlessness of community people in the face
of private reinvestment. This benign language not only
depolicizes the nature of neighborhood development but also
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disguises the psychological trauma of 'neighborhood change'.
The immense potential for displacement of Chinatown and
Roxbury residents raises several critical issues regarding
current revitalization and development efforts. Gaston and
Kennedy (1985) contend that the issue of displacement
represents a question of interests: people versus property and
profit. Essentially, the immediate concerns regarding the
parcel to parcel linkage project are: Who benefits from
development? In whose interest is revitalization? How is
development possible without displacement? How do we maximize
and ensure community control over development to prevent
displacement?
A THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS OF THE PARCEL TO PARCEL LINKAGE PROJECT
By channeling private investment to Chinatown and Roxbury,
the parcel to parcel linkage project proposes to share downtown
wealth by stimulating new economic activity in these
communities. Such needs as daycare, jobs and affordable
housing will be provided for by linkage fees generated by the
projects. Underlying the parcel to parcel linkage project is
an assumption that community people will not be displaced and
will, in fact, experience new economic vitality. The office
and hotel developments are to initiate a process of re-
integration in the Boston economy which will enhance the urban
environment and lifestyle of all community residents.
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The theoretical framework describes the role of land and
labor in a capitalist society. The parcel to parcel linkage
project is based on the economic restructuring of Boston which
have spatial and economic dimensions. In other words,
Chinatown and Roxbury will be impacted by the growth of a
Boston service economy in two ways: as a neighborhood (land)
and as a community (people-labor).3 The emergence of a service
economy in Boston is exerting development pressures on an
already saturated central business district. The demand for
physical expansion is impacting the urban spatial organization
of Chinatown and Roxbury as these communities witness the
dominance of office towers in their neighborhood. Furthermore,
these developments will initiate a secondary process of
developments which will ultimately transform the nature of the
communities.
The expansion of office development and the secondary-type
developments which office towers initiate seriously undermine
the long-term viability of Chinatown and Roxbury. Downtown
Boston expansion in these communities will encourage a process
of gentrification and massive displacement. Roxbury community
activists have observed that the parcel to parcel linkage
project along with other development plans for Roxbury has
caused real estate speculation to soar placing many renters and
3 This distinction between neighborhood and community will
be discussed further in Chapter 5. For further reading, see
Mauricio Gaston and Marie Kennedy's article "Capital Investment
or Community Development? The Struggle for Control of Turf by
Boston's Black and Latino Community." (1986)
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homeowners at risk of displacement. Ads for condominiums in
Roxbury are appearing in newspapers urging prospective buyers
not to miss out on Roxbury's renaissance.4 Similar pressures
are facing Chinatown residents. Although the rehabilitation of
the combat zone is long overdue and much needed, the type of
development activity taking place e.g., condominium conversion,
will bear no benefits for Chinatown residents.5
The increasing pressures of the downtown Boston area to
expand and revitalize threatens the ability of low-income
residents and shopowners in Chinatown and Roxbury to remain in
their community. Gentrification is inevitable since the
development activity in the Chinatown and Roxbury communities
caters to market demands for "upgraded" commercial, retail and
residential developments. If community residents are not
immediately displaced due to rent and property tax increases or
evictions, it will only be a matter of time before community
residents are forced to leave their homes and possibly their
communities.
The economic restructuring of Boston will also impact the
labor force participation of Chinatown and Roxbury residents.
As Saskia Sassen-Koob in her article "The New Labor Demand in
Global Cities," (1984) observes, the economic transformation of
4 Refer to Appendix A for the advertisement.
5 A plan to convert 9 Knapp Street, which divides
Chinatown and the combat zone, into 35 condominiums was
recently approved by the city. Refer to Appendix B for a
description of the project submitted by the developer to the
Chinatown Neighborhood Council.
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a community "entails not only a physical upgrading, but also a
reorganization of the consumption structure, both of which
generate a demand for low-wage workers." (Sassen-Koob, 1984:
157) The role of workers of color has historically been
segmented to the secondary labor market, performing the most
menial jobs for the lowest pay and/or they have served as the
source of unemployed workers used to discipline and regulate
the working class. In effect, workers of color are treated as
the purest form of a commodity - they sell their labor power in
sheer strength and endurance. The parcel to parcel linkage
project, however, proposes that the new service related jobs
will increase incomes. To assess the parcel to parcel linkage
proposition that the planned developments will substantially
improve the socioeconomic status of community residents, it is
necessary to examine the types of jobs created, their wage
scales, and availability to community residents. In sum, the
success of parcel to parcel linkage will lie, in part, in a
strategy that addresses institutionalized racism in the labor
market.
The BRA claims that the parcel to parcel linkage project
will redistribute downtown wealth to local communities by
building affordable housing and creating new jobs. This
theoretical paradigm has discussed the role of land and labor
within a perspective that addresses how structural barriers are
institutionalized to perpetuate a society characterized by
political and economic inequality. By framing the analysis of
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the parcel to parcel linkage project within this theoretical
synthesis, a key question arises which guides this inquiry of
the parcel to parcel linkage project: does the parcel to parcel
linkage project truly redistribute wealth to Chinatown and
Roxbury?
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CHAPTER II
PARCEL TO PARCEL LINKAGE
INTRODUCTION
The following chapter will discuss the objectives of parcel
to parcel linkage as outlined in the BRA interim report issued
in March 1986, the only comprehensive document on the parcel to
parcel linkage project to date. This report details the
objectives, financing, design, community benefits and role of
community participation in the Kingston-Bedford/Essex Street
and Parcel 18 projects. The analysis of the parcel to parcel
linkage project will be based on this and other BRA documents
which served as guidelines for the minority development team
proposals. The parcel to parcel linkage project claims to
benefit Chinatown and Roxbury by creating job opportunities and
affordable housing. The construction of high rise office
towers is the primary stimulus for job creation. Employed
community residents will exercise increased purchasing power
which benefits local community entrepreneurs. Linkage fees,
state housing assistance funds and the designation of city-
owned parcels will contribute to building affordable housing.
overall, the outstanding underlying message is that community
residents have much to gain from the parcel to parcel linkage
project as the infrastructure of Roxbury and Chinatown will
experience new growth.
30
PARCEL TO PARCEL LINKAGE
The concept of parcel to parcel linkage rests on directing
private investment to "less desirable" parcels of land in an
effort to revitalize historically disinvested communities. As
stated in a BRA bulletin (1986) issued to Chinatown and Roxbury
residents, parcel to parcel linkage is
(a) pioneering effort to capture the economic power of a
city-owned downtown site by linking it with a neighborhood
site to assure community ownership, and involvement, and to
ultimately achieve dramatic new neighborhood growth in both
Roxbury and Chinatown. (BRA, 1986: 5)
The primary objectives of parcel to parcel linkage based on the
BRA interim report is twofold:
1) to facilitate the spatial expansion of the Boston central
business district
2) to "reintegrate" Roxbury and Chinatown into the Boston
economy by restructuring their economic and social
functions to accommodate the emerging service economy
Within these two primary objectives, I then subcategorize the
BRA stated objective of parcel to parcel linkage project which
is to redistribute downtown wealth to strengthen neighborhood
economies. It is within the context of the primary objectives
that the BRA approach to building a neighborhood economy is
defined. In other words, the process of sharing wealth and
building the necessary foundation for a neighborhood economy is
oriented toward facilitating the type of economic growth which
is the basis for the parcel to parcel linkage project, i.e.,
the spatial expansion of the downtown Boston service economy.
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The preliminary BRA development guidelines for the
Kingston-Bedford/Essex Street and Parcel 18 sites are centered
around attracting private sector interest. The dominant
feature of the BRA guidelines for both sites is the
construction of high-rise office towers. The proposed
development alternatives for Parcel 18 is 500,000 - 900,000
gross square feet (GSF) of commercial space ranging in height
from 125 - 225 feet. The commercial space includes 125,000 -
200,000 GSF of executive office space (Class A), 275,000 -
400,000 GSF of support office space (back office space), and
50,000 - 100,000 of retail space. A 500 - 1200 underground car
garage, a cultural performance art center and 150 - 200 mixed
income residential units are also included in the Parcel 18
plan. The preliminary plan for the Kingston-Bedford/Essex
Street site is to develop one or two mid- or high-rise
executive office towers ranging from 450,000 - 700,000 GSF and
250 - 400 feet in height and a 350 room hotel. A 600 - 850
underground car garage is also included in the plan.
While the parcel to parcel linkage project will have an
equally substantial impact on the Chinatown and Roxbury
communities, it is significant to note that the BRA interim
report's discussion of Chinatown is marginal. This omission or
lack of attention regarding Chinatown reflects, in part, an
important objective of the parcel to parcel linkage project.
Although both Chinatown and Roxbury will be seriously affected
by the growth of office development in their communities,
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Chinatown is impacted circumstantially as a neighboring
community whereas Parcel 18 - Roxbury, itself, is to be
developed as an extension of the Boston office economy. As the
BRA interim report clearly states,
The key to understanding Roxbury's role as a new
neighborhood economy is to determine how this community
could be brought into the momentum of the Boston economy as
a whole, and the downtown economy in particular. (BRA,
1986: 12)
In other words, Chinatown is treated as an 'impacted' community
since it merely needs to coexist with an office tower whereas
Parcel 18 - Roxbury is wholly incorporated into Boston's
redevelopment plans. While the immediate impact of parcel to
parcel linkage may differ for Roxbury and Chinatown (and this
point is subject to debate), in the long-term, indirect or
secondary displacement is imminent for Roxbury and Chinatown.
The potential for displacement of Chinatown residents is
exacerbated by development plans to rehab the combat zone,
develop a midtown/cultural district and to continue Tufts-NEMC
expansion.6
The BRA objective in developing Parcel 18 is to offer
competitively priced back-office space to companies which are
currently being displaced from downtown Boston due to high
office rents. These companies usually relocate in the suburbs
6 The New England Medical Center plans to build a 750 car
garage for their employees in Chinatown. Originally planned
for the Oak-Nassau-Washington Street site which is a
residential part of Chinatown, the community has successfully
rejected NEMC plans for a garage on this site. Negotiations
between the BRA, NEMC and Chinatown are continuing.
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such as Waltham, Quincy and Burlington where rents are
affordable. In an effort to maintain these companies in the
Boston area, the demand for back office space is to be met by
the redevelopment of Roxbury, specifically Parcel 18. The
agglomeration of the service economy in the downtown area is
proposed as critical to the economic livlihood of Boston. As
stated in the BRA interim report,
The failure to produce space competitive with the overbuilt
suburban markets could spell serious economic trouble for
Boston. For every two hundred square feet of leased space
that becomes vacant, one job is lost. (BRA, 1986: 10)
The availability of cheap vacant land in Roxbury and its
proximity to downtown Boston make Parcel 18 a prime location
for this back office space. The BRA interim report states,
Major new commercial and residential development on Parcel
18 would combine public and private investment to take
advantage of an excellent location and large tracts of
vacant land; an underutilized labor force; lower wages; and
unprecedented demand for back office space to create the
base for a new neighborhood economy in Roxbury. (BRA, 1986:
18)
Ultimately, the "reintegration" of Roxbury into the Boston
economy is dictated by the market demand for back office space.
The BRA interim report enthusiastically claims, "This would
restore Roxbury as a self-sufficient economy where people live,
work, shop and play." (BRA, 1986: 12) However, many concerned
community activists are asking, "Which people?" "Who will
benefit?" "In whose interest is this development?"
The premise for linking the downtown Kingston-Bedford/Essex
Street sites with Parcel 18 in Roxbury is to ensure private
sector interest in the "less desirable" community of Roxbury.
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The BRA Bulletin (1986) claims,
Strong development interest in Parcel 18 will be assured by
requesting the developer chosen for the Kingston-
Bedford/Essex Street downtown site to also carry out
development of Parcel 18. (BRA, 1986: 4)
However, the "undesirableness" of Parcel 18 to private
investors is highly questionable. In fact, many local
community activists have challenged the necessity of "linking"
Parcel 18. Professors Mauricio Gaston and Marie Kennedy in
their paper, "Capital Investment or Community Development? The
Struggle for Control of Turf by Boston's Black and Latino
Community" (1986) argue,
Given the parcel's location, the amount of development
activity, the public funds already spent on land
improvement, and sky rocketing land values along the
Southwest Corridor, it is unlikely that a modestly-
scaled development of Parcel 18 would require the
leverage offered by parcel-to-parcel linkage. (emphasis
added) (Gaston and Kennedy, 1986: 33)
The critical point here is that the underlying rationale of
parcel to parcel linkage is logical only if the type of
development outlined by the BRA is assumed to be the
appropriate development for Roxbury. In other words, the
complexity of the parcel to parcel linkage project, the
extensive financial collaboration between the state, city and
private sector are only necessary for the BRA plan for Parcel
18.
Community activists argue that the approach of parcel to
parcel linkage to revitalizing local communities will result in
gentrification. The parcel to parcel linkage project, based on
encouraging private investment in Roxbury and Chinatown in the
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form of office development, will initiate a process of
"community economic development" characterized by the secondary
type developments of a downtown economy, e.g., shops,
restaurants, hotels and theatres, oriented toward servicing
upper middle class clientele.
FINANCING PARCEL TO PARCEL LINKAGE
To develop the Roxbury neighborhood economy based on
competitively priced back office space as proposed by the BRA
requires substantial subsidies. The BRA interim report claims,
"The cost of developing commercial space on Parcel 18 must be
financially underwritten in order to be able to offer rents
that compete effectively with comparable suburban facilitates."
(BRA, 1986: 48) The ability to underwrite the cost of the
Parcel 18 development is precisely the essence of parcel to
parcel linkage. Essentially, the financing of Parcel 18 is
linked to the financing of the Kingston-Bedford development.
This financial linkage is based primarily on transferring the
economic value of Kingston-Bedford to Parcel 18. (BRA, 1986:
41) The BRA interim report explains,
Critical to building a neighborhood economy, however,
is the creation of substantial land value in the
downtown parcel. The city, by linking the developed
parcels, would attribute the majority of that value to
assist in the Parcel 18 portion of the development.
That assistance would allow development on Parcel 18
to offer rents low enough to compete with suburban
office markets, thereby establishing a new office
center. (BRA, 1986: 45)
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The Kingston-Bedford development will subsidize the
financing of Parcel 18 in two ways. When the city sells the
Kingston-Bedford Street site, a portion of the sale proceeds,
approximately $15 million, will be channeled toward the Parcel
18 project. In addition to upfront money, 5% of the net
operating income of the Kingston-Bedford development will be
directed to Parcel 18 for a twenty year period to ensure its
financial feasibility. The implication of financial linkage
reflects, in part, that the economic feasibility of the parcel
to parcel linkage project is based on maximizing the land value
of the downtown site. To achieve the maximum value of the
Kingston-Bedford Street development, i.e., to generate the
maximum profit, the BRA concluded that the best land use
scenario is commercial rather than mixed-use development which
incorporates rental and equity housing. In effect, commercial
use, primarily office space, is the optimal way to maximize the
land value of Kingston-Bedford. More importantly, not only is
office space the optimal use, but in order to achieve the
"highest and best" land value of Kingston-Bedford, it is
necessary to build the greatest density office tower possible.
As the BRA interim report contends,
The highest possible density development on the Kingston-
Bedford site arguably would benefit the Parcel 18
development the most by creating more value to attribute to
it. (BRA, 1986: 45)
This underlying economic objective of parcel to parcel linkage
bears significant political consequences for the Chinatown and
Roxbury communities. Ultimately, the implication of parcel to
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parcel linkage is that in order to develop Roxbury's
neighborhood economy "based on its new role as a competitively
priced source within metropolitan Boston for back-office space"
and provide community benefits, Chinatown must tolerate the
largest and tallest office tower feasible.
Even with substantial financial linkage, the BRA interim
report asserts,
(i)t would not be sufficient to leverage development
on Parcel 18 in a way that would allow the project to
offer rents low enough to compete with suburban spaces
(BRA, 1986: 54)
and thus, additional subsidies are necessary. To avoid the
acquisition costs of Parcel 18, the city will lease the land
rather than sell it to the developer. The city will also cover
the cost of site assembly, public infrastructure construction,
and the construction of the 500-1200 car garage. The city and
state will provide a $10 million UDAG and a $5 million CDAG.
The estimated total of the city and state contribution to this
project is approximately $100 million dollars. (Boston Globe,
3/14/87) Furthermore, the required housing linkage fee
contribution of Parcel 18 will be spread over twelve years
rather than seven years as mandated in the newly amended
linkage fee payment schedule.
GUIDELINES FOR COMMUNITY BENEFITS
The BRA professes that the parcel to parcel linkage project
"was put together to assist in the building of neighborhood
economies." (BRA Bulletin, 1986: 10) In the BRA Bulletin
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(1986) distributed to Roxbury and Chinatown residents, a pin-
wheel diagram was used to illustrate how the parcel to parcel
linkage project will contribute to revitalizing the
neighborhood economies. 7 According to the BRA, the elements of
a strong neighborhood economy are: 1) employment opportunity
2) community development 3) improved quality of life 4)
affordable housing 5) business growth 6) economic viability.
(BRA Bulletin, 1986: 11)
As in the case of financial linkage where the guiding motto
was "the bigger - the better" in order to maximize the
potential land value of Kingston-Bedford, this motto is equally
applicable in the BRA's discussion of community benefits. With
respects to job creation, the BRA interim report states, "The
absolute number of jobs will be a function of the size of the
projects and the sequencing of the development activities."
(BRA Bulletin, 1986: 14) The parcel to parcel linkage project
is estimated to create approximately 11,446 jobs. This sum is
based on developing the maximum potential gross square footage
capacity of both Kingston-Bedford (900,000 GSF) and Parcel 18
(860,000 GSF). 3,946 of these jobs are projected to be
temporary construction jobs. In addition, 4,000 permanent jobs
will be created downtown and in Roxbury. 50% of the newly
created jobs in Roxbury are anticipated to be professional-
managerial and technical jobs while the remaining jobs will be
7 Refer to Appendix C for the BRA pin-wheel model of a
neighborhood economy.
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secretarial, clerical, support service and maintenance. (BRA,
1986: 14)
Although the BRA did not project the occupational breakdown
of new jobs in downtown, it is likely that the types of jobs
and the proportion of various occupational categories will be
similar to the Parcel 18 projection. However, according to Pam
Westling, BRA manager of the Kingston-Bedford/Essex Street
developments, the Kingston-Bedford office tower will not be
creating new job opportunities as much as it will accommodate
existing Boston firms. 8 This observation leads one to
speculate that the source of job creation for the Chinatown
community is primarily the 350 room hotel planned for Essex
Street.
In addition to employment opportunities, the parcel to
parcel linkage developments will generate job and housing
linkage fees. The linkage fee regulation added to the Boston
Zoning Code in December 1983 requires that developers of
commercial space contribute 5 dollars for every square foot
over 100,000 square feet to a housing trust for the development
of affordable housing. This linkage fee was payable over 12
years after the issuance of a certificate of occupancy or 2
years after the issuance of a building permit whichever
occurred sooner. (BRA, 1986: 56) In lieu of paying the
housing linkage fees, the developers can opt to build the low
8 Meeting with Pam Westling, BRA manager of the Kingston-
Bedfrod/Essex Street developments, on March 23, 1987.
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to moderate income housing themselves. The linkage program was
recently amended to include a job linkage fee of 1 dollar per
square foot over 100,000 square feet for job retraining. In
addition, the payment schedule for downtown projects was
shortened to 7 rather than 12 years. (Boston Globe, 11/12/85)
Further, the communities impacted by downtown commercial
developments are targeted to receive, at minimum, 10% of the
linkage payments and the communities impacted by neighborhood
commercial developments are to receive 20% of the linkage
payments at minimum.
The amount of housing and job linkage payments generated by
the parcel to parcel linkage project will vary with the scale
of the developments. However, the pin-wheel illustration in
the BRA Bulletin distributed to Chinatown and Roxbury residents
stated that up to 2 million dollars of job linkage fees will be
generated from both Kingston/Bedford and Parcel 18 projects of
which an estimated 1.4 million is to be targeted to Chinatown
and Roxbury. The Kingston-Bedford and Parcel 18 developments
are expected to generate up to 4 million dollars in housing
linkage fees each. Up to 50% of the housing linkage fees is
targeted to the impacted communities which means that both
Chinatown and Roxbury could each potentially receive 2 million
dollars for affordable housing. It is important to note that
the BRA anticipated sum of job and housing linkage fees are
based on developing the maximum potential GSF of Kingston-
Bedford (900,000) and Parcel 18 (860,000). Therefore, even if
41
the BRA figures are estimations, they are important to note
since it implicitly refers to a preferred project size/scale.
In other words, the BRA stated figures will most certainly
serve as minimum guidelines for the competing minority
development teams. In addition to housing linkage fees, $12.5
million will be provided by the state to each neighborhood for
below market rate permanent financing to develop housing. The
number of units are to be determined by the project development
team.
As a demonstration of the Flynn adminstration's commitment
to community economic development, parcel to parcel linkage
includes guidelines to create a Neighborhood Development Bank
(NDB). The NDB will provide below market rate financing for
affordable housing, venture capital for minority and
neighborhood businesses and funding for community development
corporations (CDC) and other non-profit community
organizations. The NDB is to be funded by a 10% contribution
from the net initial land payment for the Kingston-Bedford site
and 5% of the Kingston-Bedford development and Parcel 18
project cash flow after the first stabilized year of operation
for a twenty year period. In addition, for the same twenty
year period, the NDB will receive 10% of all net refinancing,
net syndication proceeds, and net sales residuals of both
developments.
42
PARCEL TO PARCEL LINKAGE: ADVANCING MINORITY CAPITALISM?
The participation of minority business enterprises is
critical to the parcel to parcel linkage project approach to
community economic development. At minimum 30% of all
professional and technical services e.g., engineers,
architects, lawyers, construction contracting, supplies and
services, etc., must be contracted with minority-owned firms.
The BRA has already compiled a list of all eligible minority
businesses, the Minority Business Enterprise Clearinghouse,
which will be made available to the selected development
team(s). This feature of the parcel to parcel linkage project
encourages the growth of minority capitalism. Essentially, as
Bennett Harrison (1974) has observed, "A program of black
capitalism would give minority entrepreneurs 'a bigger piece of
the action'." (Harrison, 1974: 14) While efforts to include
the participation of people of color in the expanding Boston
economy is important, it is necessary to question whether the
incorporation of professional minority businesses is an
effective strategy for long-term local community economic
development.
Another effort to involve people of color and more
importantly, to provide a sense of community ownership and
control over the parcel to parcel linkage projects is the
sharing of project equity with a minority development team. As
stated by the BRA interim report,
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The purpose of the minority team designation is to assure
community influence over the development, to create
development capacity in minority and community
organizations which have until now been excluded from major
commercial development and to create financial resources
through ownership which can be used to stimulate further
economic activity in the minority communities. (BRA, 1986:
13)
The requirements to qualify as the minority development team
include that the total net worth of the development team must
be at least $1 million. In addition, the team must demonstrate
the ability to meet the minimum start-up equity requirement of
$1.5 million. (BRA, 1986: 128) The limited financial capacity
of CDC's which have served as the core of community-based
development, prevents these institutions from participating as
autonomous entities. However, the BRA guidelines for the
parcel to parcel linkage project include plans to involve CDC's
under the auspices of the minority development team.
One of the bidding teams, Boston Development Collaborative,
has indicated that four CDC's; Roxbury Action Program (RAP),
Community Development Corporation of Boston (CDCB), Chinese
Economic Development Corporation (CEDC) and Greater Roxbury
Development Corporation (GRDC), are interested in raising the
required one million dollars to become equity partners. The
other teams have stated a commitment to setting up a fund which
will provide resources for non-profit community organizations.
While the creation of community economic development funds is
important, the parcel to parcel linkage guidelines effectively
establishes additional levels of hierarchy in the process of
community development. The minority development teams by
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allocating the profits generated by the project to the
communities serve a bureaucratic function by controlling
resources. Furthermore, the power to control resources will
enable a minority elite to shape the direction of community
economic development. Essentially, the parcel to parcel
linkage project superimposes a process of community development
which undermines an existing structure of community-based
institutions committed to grassroots development.
Initially, the BRA interim report stated that a minimum of
30% of the project equity must be held by minority developers.
Due to the demonstrated strength of the minority development
team proposals, the BRA has since proposed that the selected
minority development team have the option of requesting the BRA
to continue the development team selection process by issuing a
Request for Proposal (RFP) from prospective "majority"
developers or the minority development team may opt for the
"challenge track". The "challenge track" will enable the
minority development team to be the only development team if
they can successfully secure the necessary upfront equity,
broaden team membership and elaborate the community benefits
within 120 days. (Ricardo Millet, Deputy Director of BRA at
Chinatown community meeting, 3/31/87) The implication of this
recommendation is that the parcel to parcel linkage project may
be the first totally minority developed project of its scale
and financial worth.
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According to the BRA, the minority development team is
effectively the mechanism for community control and
participation. (BRA, 1986: 21) Five minority development teams
submitted bids to be considered equity partners. To date, two
have been eliminated from the selection process. The three
minority development teams being considered are Boston
Development Collaborative, Columbia Plaza Associates, and
Interlink Development Group. The team members are professional
Asians, Blacks and Latinos. The team compositions display an
impressive agglomeration of minority elites. The occupational
background of the minority team members reflect various areas
of expertise ranging from real estate development, academia,
political office, engineering, architecture, finance and media
personalities e.g. football player and comedian. A BRA summary
of the minority development team composition (1987) states,
To varying degrees, members of each team have participated
in the development, ownership, or management of projects in
Chinatown and/or Roxbury.
A substantial number of the team members were formally
affiliated with community social service and cultural
organizations as board members, directors or at large
members.9
The inclusion of a minority development team raises serious
concerns regarding the potential implications for the community
development process. Professors Gaston and Kennedy poses some
9 For the listing of all the minority development team
members, refer to Appendix D.
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questions which highlight how the incorporation of the minority
professional sector of the community potentially depoliticizes
urban struggle ( e.g., for housing and jobs),
How strong is the tendency to professionalize the political
activity centering on development issues? To what extent
does this professionalization promote the demobilization of
street-based activism? (Gaston and Kennedy, 1986: 2)
The ability to fulfill the minimum financial criterion and
demonstrate the organizational capacity to participate in
projects of the magnitude contemplated is a self-selecting
process, i.e., those who compete will obviously have the means
to do so. There are at least two critical implications of such
criteria for the future of community development. The public-
private partnership as epitomized by the parcel to parcel
linkage project, indicate a dominant trend toward privatizing
community development. More and more emphasis is placed on
financial and organizational capacity to develop bigger
projects while neglecting the human capacity building aspect of
community development. In effect, successful community
development is increasingly being measured by "bricks and
mortar" type developments rather than by community organizing
and empowerment. To assume that the minority development team
can represent the needs and interests of Chinatown and Roxbury
community residents because they are people of color is not
just naive but potentially divisive. A Boston Globe article on
the minority development team dated March 14, 1987 states,
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So important are the associations of individuals that are
occurring on these teams, according to city and community
officials, that the end result could amount to significant
reordering of the economic leadership within the minority
communities.
Gaston and Kennedy (1986) describe the reaction of the Roxbury
Planning Advisory Council (PAC) to the minority development
teams, "...the PAC feels that the BRA is using this wedge to
buy people off and to split the community." (Gaston and
Kennedy, 1986: 34) In sum, to assert that the minority
development team is effectively the mechanism for community
control is to neglect the significance of class interest and
alliance.
The participation of a minority development team while
appearing to be an innovative approach by the BRA to increase
the access of people of color to downtown wealth is effectively
a most creative and reprehensible way to co-opt the elite of
the Chinatown and Roxbury community to act as facilitators of a
process which will inevitably displace community residents.
The analysis that the minority development team will ultimately
serve the interests of the BRA is grounded in two observations.
First, the minority development team members are "successful"
professional Blacks, Asians and Latinos. Each team
demonstrates substantial aggregate net worth - CPA, over $50
million, BDC, over $20 million, Interlink, over $30 million.
(BRA, 1987) The relative position of these minority developers
to power and money is qualitatively and quantitatively
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different from those community residents whose interests they
are supposedly acting on behalf.
As real estate developers, the minority team members
implicitly share interests with other private developers who
seek to maximize profits. As David Gordon (1972) contends,
"Groups of individuals sharing the same functions within the
process of production constitute an objectively-defined class,
as it are, despite themselves." (Gordon, 1972: 57) In effect,
the criteria of racial identification with the impacted
communities does not implicitly mean that the minority
development team have the same interests or objectives as
community residents. The implication of this observation is
stated by Gordon (1972),
In that the members of a given class share objectively-
determined common circumstances and activities, they also
share economic interests (in strictly objective terms), for
economic rewards accruing to any individual within a class
will depend in part on the total share captured by his
class in competition with other classes. (Gordon, 1972: 57)
Thus, to assert that the minority development team can
represent the interests and needs of low-income communities of
color is to essentially shield the BRA, city and state from its
effort to preserve and reinforce the status quo as they find
eager stand-ins who seek to gain equally from this development
scheme.
The second observation which supports the analysis that the
minority development team will ultimately serve the interests
of the BRA is demonstrated in the minority development team
proposals. By virtue of their participation in the project,
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the minority development team agrees to accept and work within
certain constraints defined by the BRA and the city. This is
demonstrated by the scope of the minority development team
proposals which varies only with regards to the specific
details of the BRA guidelines for the parcel to parcel linkage
project, i.e., scale of office towers and allocation of
community benefits.1 0  The proposals do not challenge the
legitimacy of the BRA approach to viable community economic
development and "redistribution" of wealth. Essentially, the
objectives of the BRA will be fulfilled in a most insidious
manner. By claiming to advocate for "community control"
through minority "ownership" of the parcel to parcel linkage
project, the BRA has successfully exploited class divisions
within the communities to misdirect conflict. The minority
development teams will need to deal with the communities
directly and as a result, will be mistakenly held responsible
as the initiators of the parcel to parcel linkage project.
A review panel has been set up with representatives of the
BRA, city, state, Parcel 18+ Task Force, and the Chinatown
Neighborhood Council to review the proposals and select the
minority development team. At the monthly BRA Board meeting on
May 21st, the "winner" of the Request for Qualifications (RFQ)
process will be selected, i.e., the minority development team
will be selected. The formal public announcement is
10 Refer to Appendix E for a summary of each of the
minority development team proposals.
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anticipated to take place shortly after. At that time, the
selected team, the "winner", can either choose to accept the
"challenge track" or request the BRA to start the Request for
Proposal (RFP) process i.e., to select the majority development
team. During the March 31st Chinatown community meeting where
the minority teams presented their proposals, all three teams
expressed a willingness to accept the challenge track if they
are selected to be the minority development team.
CONCLUSION
The parcel to parcel linkage project, estimated to cost 400
million dollars, reflects a collaboration between the city,
state and private developers to leverage substantial public
funds to subsidize private development. Minority participation
and equity sharing are the primary mechanisms to redistribute
downtown wealth. However, the concentration of wealth in a
small class of minority elites does not signify a
redistribution of wealth that benefits low income communities
of color. Moreover, the benefits to be reaped by the Chinatown
and Roxbury primarily through linkage funds is contingent on
the scale of the projects: the larger the project, the greater
the benefits. In sum, the parcel to parcel linkage project
represents a "trickle down" approach to community economic
development.
The BRA claims that the parcel to parcel linkage project
will rebuild the neighborhood economies of Chinatown and
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Roxbury. Indeed, this project will "rebuild" the neighborhood
economies but the transformation that will take place is not
based on meeting community needs or objectives. The objective
of rebuilding the Chinatown and Roxbury economies is to better
enable these communities to continue to service the growth of
private capital, i.e., the Boston service economy.
The strategies to redistribute wealth outlined in the
parcel to parcel linkage do not entail a process where the
communities share equally in wealth and decision making powers.
The elements of a neighborhood economy: land, labor and capital
remain under the control and interests of the private sector.
The role of the city and the BRA in subsidizing this project
is, in effect, serving the interests of the private sector. As
such, the parcel to parcel linkage will reinforce the status
quo and in effect, the city's celebrated plan to redistribute
wealth via parcel to parcel linkage is an ineffective and
incomplete effort.
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CHAPTER III
SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE OF CHINATOWN
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will provide the necessary information to
examine the potential impact of the parcel to parcel linkage
project job creation agenda for Chinatown workers. The BRA
claims that the parcel to parcel linkage project will
revitalize the economies of Chinatown and Roxbury by creating
new employment opportunities for community residents. This
chapter describes the socioeconomic characteristics of
Chinatown residents based on 1980 census data. An analysis of
these characteristics will contribute to an assessment of the
economic conditions and needs of Chinatown residents. More
specifically, an analysis of the data will determine the extent
of Chinatown residents' participation in the secondary labor
market.
The socioeconomic profile of Chinatown will provide the
necessary context in which to evaluate the transferability of
workers' skills and experience, the types of jobs that will be
accessible to community workers and whether these jobs will
substantially improve the socioeconomic status of Chinatown
workers.
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METHODOLOGY
The methodology used to synthesize a socioeconomic profile
of Boston Chinatown was based on an examination of 1980 census
data. I analyzed data categorized according to racial group
for three census tracts: 702, 704 and 705. Although only
census tract 702 is within the formal geographical boundaries
of Chinatown, I have included information for the surrounding
census tracts, 704 and 705, formally in the South End. Census
tracts 704 and 705 border Chinatown and contain a substantial
portion of the Boston Asian population. Since housing in
Chinatown is severely limited, many residents live in the
neighboring community of the South End although they work, shop
and socialize in Chinatown.
In order to assess the status of the Chinatown community
relative to other Boston communities, I have used census data
prepared by the BRA. The BRA organized 1970 and 1980 census
data according to neighborhoods or planning districts.
Chinatown is included as part of the Central (Boston) planning
district which also includes such neighborhoods as South Cove,
Bay Village, downtown and central Boston (financial and
shopping district), West End, North End, and the Waterfront.
Obviously, it is difficult to discern specific information
about the Chinatown community from this data, however, census
data organized by neighborhood is useful in comparing the
status of Chinatown (based on census tract 702 data) with other
Boston neighborhoods. Furthermore, by comparing census tract
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702 data with the data for planning district Central, it is
possible to assess the status of Chinatown relative to its
immediate surrounding neighborhoods.
SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE
A. Distribution of Boston Asian Population
Approximately 34% of the total Asian population in Boston
live in or nearby Chinatown. Almost 18% of the total Asian
population reside in Chinatown. The spatial concentration of
Asians in primarily two Boston communities; Chinatown and South
End is highlighted in BRA Table 11 which identifies the racial
makeup of each neighborhood.1 1 Central (includes Chinatown)
demonstrated the greatest concentration of Asians, 16.2%. The
South End followed with 11.9%. While Allston-Brighton
demonstrated the next largest percentage of Asians, 5.8%, it
was a significantly smaller proportion of its population than
Central and the South End. The remaining Boston communities
did not exhibit a substantial Asian population. In effect, the
Boston Asian population is clustered primarily in two
communities which, in fact, border each other geographically.
The size of the Asian population in Central Boston is
increasing rapidly. Within a ten year span, the Asian
population increased 137% from 1,475 in 1970 to 3,412 in 1980.
On the other hand, while the absolute number of Asians in the
11 Refer to Appendix F for all tables related to the
socioeconomic profile of Chinatown.
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South End did increase by 9.5% from 2,923 in 1970 to 3,063 in
1980, as a proportion of the South End population, Asians
actually decreased from 12.9% in 1970 to 11.9% in 1980. (BRA,
1985: 50) This situation indicates an increase in the non-
Asian population of the South End.
The majority of Asians in the Chinatown area are ethnic
Chinese. As Table 1 in Appendix H shows, over 76% of Chinatown
residents are Asian of which 98.5% are Chinese. In the
surrounding census tracts (which is formally the South End)
over 60% of the population of census tract 704 is Asian of
which 96.5% are Chinese and in census tract 705, 25.5% are
Asian and 97.6% of them are Chinese.
B. Concentration of Immigrants
Most Asians in Chinatown and the surrounding census tracts
are immigrants. About 77.5% of all Asians in the three census
tracts are foreign born. (Table 2) The immigrant status of the
community residents is further highlighted by Table 3 which
demonstrates that almost 100% of the population in these census
tracts speak a language other than english at home. The
proportion of individuals over 18 years old who speak little or
no english in the three census tracts is quite substantial;
over 60% of all Asian Chinatown residents speak little or no
english.
C. Educational Level
The lack of english speaking skills among the majority of
Chinatown residents does not correlate with the level of
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education obtained by these community people. Over 50% of all
Asians in the three census tracts have completed at least 8
years of elementary education. This percentage of Asians who
have completed an elementary education compares quite well with
other Boston neighborhoods (BRA Table 12). However, Asians in
the Chinatown area do not receive as much education as
residents of other communities. About 17% of Asians in
Chinatown, 26% in census tract 704 and 18% in census tract 705
have completed four years of high school compared to a city-
wide average of 34.5%.
The percentage of college educated Chinatown area residents
is small and not surprisingly, compares poorly with other
Boston neighborhoods with the exception of historically white
working-class neighborhoods; East and South Boston, and
predominantly poor black communities; Roxbury, North Dorchester
and Mattapan (BRA Table 12). Only 10% of the Asians in
Chinatown and 5% in both census tracts 704 and 705 have
completed four or more years of college.
The disparity between educational level and english
speaking skills may be explained by the fact that while a
significant number of Asians have received at least an
elementary education, they were educated in a foreign language.
This disparity supports the observation that a substantial
proportion of the Asian population in the Chinatown area are
immigrants. Furthermore, this disparity suggests that the
majority of immigrants are adults.
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D. Labor Force Participation
In spite of the language barrier faced by the Asian
population in Chinatown and census tracts 704 and 705, the
participation of Chinatown Asians in the labor force is quite
high. According to the labor force status data of Chinatown
area residents in 1979 (Table 5), almost 100% of the persons
over the age of 16 who participated in the labor force worked.
97% of the Chinatown Asian labor force, 97.6% of the Asian
labor force in census tract 704 and 98.1% of the Asian labor
force in census tract 705 were employed in 1979. The tendency
toward high labor force participation among Chinatown area
Asians contributes to the general high participation rate of
Central Boston. The BRA study, "Diversity and Change in
Boston's Neighborhoods", (1985) claim "The highest
participation rates were recorded in 1980 for Back Bay-Beacon
Hill (71 percent) and Central (69 percent)." (BRA, 1985: 91)
A further characterization of Chinatown Asian labor force
participation is extended work days and hours. (Table 6) Over
65% of the workers in all three census tracts worked 40 or more
weeks in 1980. Of these workers, over 80% of them worked more
than 35 hours per week. Furthermore, the data indicates that a
substantial proportion of the Asian labor force, 45% of
Chinatown's Asian labor force, 44% of census tract 704 and 43%
of census tract 705, worked 50-52 weeks in 1980. Over 85% of
the workers who worked 50-52 weeks also worked more than 35
hours per week.
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The intensive participation of Asians in the labor force is
quite outstanding when compared to other Boston neighborhoods.
According to BRA Table 13, Central (which includes Chinatown)
demonstrated the highest percentage of workers, 59%, who worked
more than 35 hours per week for 50-52 weeks in 1979. Even so,
the percentage of these workers (which includes Asians) is
significantly less than the 85% of Chinatown laborers who
worked extended work days and hours.
These statistics indicate that in addition to high
participation in the labor force, the majority of workers in
the Chinatown community worked longer than 8 hour days for most
of the year with little leisure time. The harsh conditions
characteristic of Chinatown Asian labor force participation is
fully appreciated when contrasted with the labor force
participation of other Boston residents. This data indicates
that Asian workers in the Chinatown area are potentially super
exploited laborers.
E. Occupational Status
Census data regarding occupation status is broken down into
broad categories which prove to be a drawback in analyzing the
concentration of Asians in specific occupations because the
categories are so vague. To compensate for the lack of
specificity, I supplemented the data with statistics from the
Division of Employment Security's (DES) report on Labor Market
Information for Affirmative Action Programs for Boston SMSA in
1984. Despite this drawback, the census data does provide
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sound evidence of the secondary labor market status of the
majority of Asian workers in the Chinatown area. The greatest
concentration of Asians were in two occupational categories;
1) service and 2) machine operators, fabricators & laborers.
(Table 7) The greatest concentration of all Asian laborers was
in the service sector which employed 39% of Chinatown workers,
41% of Asian census tract 704 workers and 42% of census tract
705 workers. According to the Detailed Occupations by 1980
Census Occupation Code included in the DES report, 2,415 Asians
in the Boston SMSA were employed in food service occupations
such as bartenders, waiters/waitresses, cooks, kitchen workers,
etc. Approximately 23% of Boston food service occupations was
held by Asians.
As Table 7 indicates, the second occupational category
which employed the greatest percentage of Asian laborers was
machine operators, fabricators & laborers. Under this general
category of which approximately 25% of the Asian labor force of
each census tract was employed, the majority of them were
machine operators which may reflect the concentration of Asian
women in the garment industry. This observation is confirmed
by the census data in the DES report which states that 1,252
Asian women in the Boston SMSA were employed as sewing machine
operators in 1979. Asian women made up 17% of all garment
workers in the Boston area. According to a publication, Our
Roots in History - Commemorating the 100th Anniversary of the
First Chinese Exclusion Act, co-authored by two Boston
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Chinatown activists, 77% of the men in Chinatown are employed
in the restaurants and 75% of the women work in the garment
factories usually on a piece-rate basis. The authors write,
"They work six days a week for 10-12 hours each day with low
wages and no employee benefits." (Kiang and Lee, 1982: )
While there was a notable percentage of the labor force in
such occupational categories as professional/managerial and
technical, sales and administration, upon closer examination of
the breakdown of these broad categories, very few were actually
employed as traditionally defined professionals. Table 7
indicates that while 14% of employed laborers in Chinatown were
classified as professional/managerial, only 40 were actually
professional specialists, e.g. lawyers, doctors, etc. For
census tracts 704 and 705, there were even fewer workers who
were classified as professional/managerial.
The concentration of workers in the secondary labor market
is further evidenced by the size of workers in clerical
positions. Over 50% of all workers who were grouped under
technical, sales and adminstration were employed in clerical
jobs. The percentage is even greater for census tracts 704 and
705.
F. Place of Work
Approximately, 10.6% of Asian workers in Chinatown did not
report a place of work. According to the BRA report on Boston
neighborhoods, the neighborhoods with high proportions of
workers not reporting place of work were Mattapan (20.6%),
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Central (19.8%), Roxbury (17.2%), South End (14.5%),
Charlestown (14.3%) and North Dorchester (14.3%). (BRA, p.100)
The BRA rationalized this occurrence in part by noting that
these neighborhoods are comprised of a significant number of
minorities and immigrants. While this observation is
significant, the causal relation is dubious and in fact,
segmented labor market may be an more accurate explanation.
The BRA report states, "One suspects that the factors of
unemployment, part-time employment, multiple job sites, or job
changes have made this question more difficult to answer."
(emphasis added) (BRA, 1985: 100) It is significant to note
that the factors which the BRA has identified as reasons why
workers did not report a place of work are characteristics of
secondary labor market jobs. In sum, the notable percentages
of workers who did not identify a work place may be evidence of
their participation in the secondary labor market.
G. Income
Given the substantial and intensive participation of Asians
in the labor force, it is quite revealing to note that the
income levels of Asian households does not bear a positive
correlation to labor force participation. Table 8 indicates
that the per capita income of Chinatown residents was $4,017,
for 704 residents it was $3,509 and for 705 residents, the per
capita income was $4,429. 72% of all Chinatown households
earned less that $15,000 in 1979. In fact, as Table 9
demonstrates, Chinatown had the greatest concentration of
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families earning less than $15,000 of all Boston neighborhoods
for 1979.
The median income for Chinatown households was $9,059, in
census tract 704, it was $11,845 and in census tract 705, the
median household income was $13,879 while the Boston SMSA
median household income was $18,694. (BRA, 1985: 142) As Table
10 indicates, the median income of Chinatown families is the
lowest of all Boston neighborhoods. Furthermore, the
differences among the median household income for Asians in the
three census tract suggest that Chinatown residents may,
indeed, be more economically oppressed than Asians who live in
the neighboring community.
CONCLUSION
Boston Chinatown is home to over 2,600 Chinese people of
whom 77% are immigrants. Over 34% of the total Asian
population of Greater Boston resides in Chinatown or in the
neighboring community of the South End. Partly due to a lack
of English speaking skills, the predominant sources of
employment for Chinatown community residents continue to be in
the restaurant or garment industries where work hours are long
and wages are low.
The parcel to parcel linkage project promises new
employment opportunities for Chinatown workers which transcends
traditional work activity and roles. This examination of the
socioeconomic profile of the Chinatown labor force which
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highlighted the dominance of non-english speaking immigrants,
the small number of high school graduates and the concentration
of Chinatown workers in the secondary labor market, concludes
that the transition to service related industries will be very
difficult for the majority of the Chinatown labor force.
Chapter Four will examine how the majority of service jobs are
typically secondary labor market jobs and thus, even if
Chinatown workers are able to access these jobs, it is highly
unlikely that their socioeconomic status will greatly improve.
In light of the socioeconomic profile of Chinatown, primarily
the lack of english speaking skills, and the true nature of
service sector jobs, the following chapter will evaluate the
effectiveness of the parcel to parcel linkage project in
addressing the economic inequality experienced by Chinatown
workers.
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CHAPTER IV
THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING OF BOSTON
ON THE CHINATOWN LABOR FORCE
INTRODUCTION
The parcel to parcel linkage project exemplifies how local
communities will be impacted by the shift of the Boston economy
from a manufacturing based economy to a service economy. The
parcel to parcel linkage project will accommodate the spatial
demands of the central business district by extending office
tower developments into the communities which immediately
surround it. In addition to the physical transformation of
these communities, the economic function of community workers
will also be impacted.
This chapter will explore the potential impact of the
economic restructuring of Boston on the labor force
participation of Chinatown workers. The growth of the
Massachusetts and specifically, the Boston service economy will
be briefly documented. This chapter will examine the nature of
service sector jobs with regards to wages and job activity in
order to assess whether the anticipated job creation initiated
by the parcel to parcel linkage project will improve the
secondary labor market status of Chinatown workers. Moreover,
based on the socioeconomic characteristics of the Chinatown
labor force, this chapter will discuss the effectiveness of job
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retraining as the mechanism to enable Chinatown workers to make
the transition to service sector jobs.
Although the tenants of the office tower developments have
yet to be determined and thus, the precise nature of these new
jobs are unknown, it is possible to speculate on the types of
occupations and wage scales that will be created by the parcel
to parcel linkage project. By examining the existing
occupational categories of an office tower economy, a general
outline of potential new jobs and wages can be derived. This
information will contribute to an evaluation of the future role
of Chinatown workers in the Boston service economy.
ECONOMIC TRENDS
There has been great debate regarding the significance and
implications of the emerging dominance of a national economy
centered around service related industries. The expansion of
service sector economic activities has been upheld as
facilitating the transformation of U.S. society to a new "post
industrial" society focused on the production of information
rather than goods.
While the transformation may or may not be a total
metamorphosis of our nation's economic and industrial
structure, there is indeed a trend indicating employment growth
in service related industries and substantial decline in
manufacturing industries. Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison
in their study, "The Great American Job Machine: The
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Proliferation of Low Wage Employment in the U.S. Economy"
(1986), contend that the national trend "reveals a continuation
into the 1980's of a strong trend toward employment growth in
the service sector, with literally no expansion whatsoever in
employment in goods production." (Bluestone and Harrison,
1986: 3) In fact, they argue that since 1981, private sector
service employment primarily in transportation and public
utilities; wholesale and retail trade; finance, insurance and
real estate; and business and personal services, "has been
responsible for all of the total net growth in the number of
civilian jobs." (Bluestone and Harrison,1986: 3)
A report issued by the Division of Employment Securities
(DES), "Massachusetts Industrial Employment Projected Changes,
1984-1995", (1986) provides ample statistics demonstrating the
rapid growth of service-related industries in Massachusetts.
The DES report (1986) also describes how this growth is the
force behind Massachusetts' economic recovery. Over the next
decade, 1984-1995, Massachusetts is projected to experience a
growth rate of almost 16% generating 450,000 new jobs. Over
one-half of the jobs created will be in the service sector.
85% of these new service sector jobs will be in transportation,
communications and utilities, finance, insurance, real estate,
wholesale and retail trade, services and government. (DES,
1986: 2) The report states that the fastest growing industry
is computer and data processing which will more than double its
current capacity, growing by 108%. (DES, 1986: iv)
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The specific service industries anticipated to undergo
extensive economic growth in Massachusetts over the next decade
are: a) business services accounting for approximately 87,500
of the new jobs; b) health services by 27%; c) financial
services by 16% especially in banking services which will gain
over 6,400 new workers. The number of insurance
carriers/agents and real estate employees are anticipated to
also increase significantly; d) durable goods manufacturing
industries are expected to grow by almost 12% producing defense
related technology and much of the hardware necessary for the
operation of an "information society": office computing
machinery, communications equipment, electronic computers and
accessories and guided missiles; e) wholesale and retail
trade, specifically food service industries, i.e., eating and
drinking places; f) construction which is reported to be "one
of the fastest growing sectors in the Massachusetts economy."
(DES, 1986: vi)
The two sectors of the Massachusetts economy expected to
decline are nondurable manufacturing and employment in the
public sector. The DES report (1986) states that 28 of 43
nondurable industry groups or 65% of all nondurable goods
manufacturing is projected to decline by 6.5% which is greater
than the national projected decline rate of 2.5%. The specific
impacted industries are textiles, apparel, leather and food and
dairy products. The public sector share of employment, i.e.,
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government employment is also expected to decline, from 6.2% to
5.4% of total Massachusetts employment.
There is no doubt that the Boston economy is undergoing a
transformation characterized by a shift from manufacturing
industries to service-related industries. The rapid saturation
of downtown Boston with high-rise office towers and the
increasing pressure to expand beyond the financial district is
evidence of Boston's full participation in the service economy
boom. In sum, Boston is well underway to becoming a "global
city" which, according to Saskia Sassen-Koob, is a "center(s)
for the servicing and management of the vastly decentralized
manufacturing sector and for the globalization of economic
activity generally." (Sassen-Koob, 1984: 149) According to a
Boston Globe article dated January 23, 1986, Boston's central
business district vacancy rate of 8% is the second lowest of
all cities in the United States. (The lowest central business
district vacancy rate is experienced by Manhattan, NY) The
survey conducted by a New York based real estate brokerage
firm, Cushman and Wakefield, ranked Boston as having the second
most expensive rental fee of $50 per square foot, $20 less than
Manhattan which ranked first. However, in sharp contrast to
the office rental status of downtown Boston, the Cushman and
Wakefield survey cites Boston's suburban office vacancy rate as
16%, twice that of Boston.
The emergence of a service economy and the pressure to
centralize this economic activity in the downtown Boston can be
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discerned from the Cushman and Wakefield survey. These growth
trends are affirmed by the BRA interim report which claims that
the 42 large firms in downtown Boston are expected to expand
and "will need office space that is competitively priced, and
lower priced back office space where support services could be
relocated." (BRA, 1986: 42) In light of the notable suburban
office vacancy rate, the magnitude of subsidy that will be
necessary to ensure that back office space in Roxbury is
competitively priced will be quite substantial.
During 1985-1986, Boston gained 15,645 new jobs in the
financial, insurance, real estate, medical, educational,
business and professional sectors. (DES, 1987: 2) The private
sector accounted for 75% of these newly created jobs. (DES,
1987: 2) In 1970, 38% of Boston workers were employed in the
finance, business, health, education and professional service
sectors, whereas in 1980, 46% of Boston's workers were employed
in these sectors. (BRA, 1985: 95) Between 1983 and 1990,
Boston is expected to gain 72,000 new jobs primarily in
communications, finance, management and other business and
professional services. (BRA, 1985: 12)
The expansion in "white collar" occupations is accompanied
by a general erosion of the manufacturing job base. During the
period, 1970 - 1980, the number of workers in such occupational
categories as craftsmen and foreman, operatives, transportation
operatives and laborers fell from 28% of Boston's workforce to
21%. DES (1987) reports that between 1985-1986, the Boston
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manufacturing sector experienced a 5.8% decline in its job base
meaning a loss of 2,432 jobs. In the Boston garment industry
alone, 10 factories each employing an average of 60-350 women
each have shut down since December 1985.12 However, in spite
of manufacturing decline, the DES report (1986) optimistically
states, "While new technology has caused worker displacement,
and the effect of recovery has not been the same for everyone,
more people than ever are employed and incomes are rising."
(emphasis added) (DES, 1986: iv)
ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING AND JOB OPPORTUNITIES
Much of the adulation regarding the expansion of service
related industries rests with certain misconceptions about the
nature of service sector jobs. As the previous quotation from
the DES report (1986) implies, service sector jobs are
generally associated with high wages. Service jobs are also
characterized as "brain" jobs necessitating education and
training. Moreover, service jobs are supposedly less labor
intensive than manufacturing jobs and command greater prestige
and skill. However, current research on the growth of the
service economy and its impact on labor markets has provided
substantial evidence which challenges the assumptions about the
nature of service jobs. Sassen-Koob (1984) notes,
12 Phone conversation with Terri Oshiro, Program Director
of the Workers Assistance Center in Boston Chinatown, 4/10/87
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Not all white-collar jobs are highly desirable; sales and
clerical occupations, which tend to be low-paid and are
more likely to be part-time and intermittent, actually
account for a little over half of all white-collar jobs.
(Sassen-Koob, 1986: 149)
In fact, research on the service sector job creation soundly
concludes that the share of low wage jobs is, in fact, much
higher in the service sector than in manufacturing. As Richard
Walker in his article, "Is There a Service Economy? The
Changing Capitalist Division of Labor", (1985) writes, "These
crude notions have been subject to devastating empirical
refutation: the bulk of "service" jobs are low paying, low
skill, dead-end, and occupied by women and minorities."
(Walker, 1985: 45)
Nationally and locally, new jobs are primarily the outcome
of service sector expansion. This trend raises immediate
concerns regarding the true nature of service jobs for the
majority of working people. A DES report (1986) states,
"Although some service jobs require little skill and pay close
to the minimum wage, others (such as law, medicine,
engineering, advertising, accounting, and data processing) have
high productivity and earnings growth." (DES, 1986: 6)
Unfortunately, current research has demonstrated that the
service jobs which "require little skill and pay close to the
minimum wage" are the fastest growing sector of service jobs.
Stanbeck and et. al., in their study, "Services: The New
Economy" (1983), contend,
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(t)here is abundant evidence that a very large support
system of relatively low skill clerical and service-worker
type jobs is still required in order for the more elite and
well-paid sectors of professionals, managers and
technicians to carry out their daily tasks under existing
institutional and organizational arrangements. (Stanbeck,
1983: 87)
This observation is affirmed by Sassen-Koob (1984) who
proclaims,
There is a strong tendency to assume backward jobs to be
part of backward sectors. Yet, low wage, dead-end jobs can
be part of the most dynamic sectors of highly advanced
industrialized economies. (Sassen-Koob, 1983: 164)
Bluestone and Harrison (1986) note that low wage jobs are
gaining prominence in the service sector. They contend that
historically, a greater proportion of service sector jobs have
been low wage compared with manufacturing jobs. More
importantly, this trend of low wage service jobs is expanding
and comprising a majority of the new jobs created. They write,
Traditionally, two out of every five jobs in this sector
have been low wage, compared with less than one in five in
manufacturing. This ratio does not seem to have
significantly changed over time, although the number of low
wage service jobs has been creeping up since 1979 with half
of all net new employment in services being low-wage.
(Bluestone and Harrison, 1986: 38)
In fact, Bluestone and Harrison's (1986) study of income
distribution among the major U.S. industries and occupations
demonstrated that between 1979 and 1984, 58% of all net new
employment paid annual wages of less than $7,000. (Bluestone
and Harrison, 1986: 43)
A critical feature of the service economy is that it
necessitates the expansion of a low wage, low skill job base to
continue servicing a professional/managerial elite. According
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to a 1987 DES report on the employment trends in the Boston
service delivery economy, among the top twenty two occupations
expected to generate 50% of the job growth in Boston are:
salespersons, janitors, porters, cleaners, waiters/waitresses,
cashiers, guards and doorkeepers, and kitchen helpers. 1 3 As
Sassen-Koob's (1984) research demonstrates,
The major service industries shows a significant presence
of low wage jobs, particulary a subcategory of low wage
jobs with few if any skill and language requirements and no
history of unionization - in brief, jobs that both demand
the existence and contribute to the expansion of an
underclass. (Sassen-Koob, 1984: 154)
This aspect of service sector growth bears significant
ramifications for future employment opportunities, particularly
for women and people of color. More and more newly created
jobs in the service economy are characteristically secondary
labor market jobs. According to Stanbeck et. al., (1983)
Poorly paid service jobs are likely to be poorly sheltered
(without internal labor markets, benefits, job security,
etc.) and to be part-time in nature. They are also more
likely to be held by women, young people or members of
minority groups than are better paid service jobs or non
service jobs in general. (Stanbeck, 1983: 87)
Bluestone and Harrison (1986) noted that not only did low wage
service sector jobs proliferate between 1979 and 1984 but this
new growth was actually accompanied by a national decline of
5.5% or 440,000 high wage jobs.
13 For a complete listing of the twenty-two occupations
expected to generate 50% of the Boston job growth and the net
change of the job growth in total numbers, refer to Appendix G.
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The observation that a substantial number of jobs created
on the national and local level are predominantly low wage jobs
potentially signifies a "shifting toward an increasingly
polarized labor market structure." (Bluestone and Harrison,
1986: 4) In effect, the most notable impact of service sector
growth is rapid movement toward a greater dichotomization of
good versus bad jobs or in other words, a move toward greater
income inequality as people will be concentrated in either high
wage or low wage jobs. Stanbeck et. al., describes this
phenomenon,
For the U.S. economy, the net result of combined job
increases and decreases in services and non services has
been a tendency in both periods for employment growth to be
greater in the upper and lower earning ranges than in the
middle. (Stanbeck, 1983: 79)
Essentially, the expansion of a service sector job base
heightens the segmentation of the labor market. The attributes
of service sector work seriously undermines the general notion
that service economic growth upgrades the nature of work and
wages for all. This understanding is especially important for
local community organizations who develop strategies to
increase employment opportunities for low-income people, people
of color and women. Not only has research conducted by
Bluestone and Harrison (1986), Stanbeck et. al., (1981) and
Sassen-Koob (1984) among many others demonstrate that the
economic exploitation of people of color and women will
continue but equally as important, that there is a tendency
toward an extreme kind of economic dualism characterized by the
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co-existence of two types of economic classes, the very rich
and the very poor. As Sassen-Koob (1984) contends, "(T)he
overall growth in service jobs contains a very pronounced
inequality in terms of income." (Sassen-Koob, 1984: 156) The
long-term implications of this trend are noted by Bluestone and
Harrison (1986), "If this pattern of development continues, the
standard of living of a growing proportion of the American
workforce will be significantly jeopardized." (Bluestone and
Harrison, 1986: 5)
PARCEL TO PARCEL LINKAGE JOB CREATION AND IMPACT ON CHINATOWN
WORKERS
An important element of rebuilding a neighborhood economy
is job creation. Employed residents exercise purchasing power
which stimulates commercial activity and economic growth. The
BRA recognizes that job opportunities are integral to the
revitalization of economically depressed communities. The BRA
claims that the parcel to parcel linkage project will stimulate
the economies of Chinatown and Roxbury by "provid(ing)
opportunities for neighborhood business expansion and access to
jobs otherwise unattainable." (emphasis added) (BRA, 1986: 22)
The primary stimulus for opportunity and employment is office
tower development. The BRA Bulletin (1986) states,
For Chinatown, the development of office and retail space
and a hotel complex at the nearby downtown Kingston-
Bedford/Essex Street could not only strengthen the existing
economy, but also allow Chinatown residents to build beyond
traditional economic limits with regard to job diversity
and occupational mobility. (BRA Bulletin, 1986: 15)
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While the employment opportunities created by the parcel to
parcel linkage project may indeed introduce "job diversity" to
a labor force employed predominantly in restaurants and garment
factories, the nature of these new service jobs will not
substantially improve their economic status. Research on the
nature of service sector employment has demonstrated that the
majority of service jobs are predominantly low wage and low
skill. In light of labor market segmentation based in part on
the racial division of labor and the historical role of
immigrant labor, it is highly probable that the parcel to
parcel linkage project will merely re-circulate Chinatown
workers among secondary labor market jobs. Furthermore, based
on the limited english speaking skills of the Chinatown labor
force, it is highly probable that many workers will either not
make the transition to service jobs or only access such
occupations as janitors, fast food preparation or kitchen
helpers which require minimal english speaking ability.
Chapter Three detailed the socioeconomic status of Chinatown
workers and noted some characteristics which define the labor
force participation of Chinatown workers. Many Chinatown
residents are non- or limited english speaking immigrants who
have received minimal education in their homeland. Since the
majority of Chinatown workers are employed in restaurants or
garment factories, the transferability of their job skills is
limited. In light of the declining manufacturing job base,
when workers are displaced, retraining is sought as the
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mechanism to enable these workers to re-enter the labor force.
The type of job training that displaced workers undergo
typically reflect the constraints of workers' language facility
and education. More importantly, job training prepares workers
with specific skills for specific types of jobs.
Current retraining efforts of displaced Chinatown workers
clearly indicates the new role of the Chinatown labor force in
the emerging Boston service economy. The experience of the P &
L garment workers is an important case study to explore the
potential job retraining efforts of the parcel to parcel
linkage project.1 4  Approximately 140 displaced P & L workers
are currently enrolled in training programs or English as a
Second Language (ESL) classes. 70 of these workers are
enrolled in the Roxbury Community College training program and
are learning skills in food service, banking, clerical or
daycare. 20 workers are enrolled in a privately contracted
program with the Saluti Company learning skills related to
insurance, mutual funds and banking. The remaining 50 workers
are enrolled in ESL classes and the status of their retraining
program is "very shaky" since there is no commitment from the
state or the federal government regarding training funds coming
14 The P & L Sportswear Company finally closed its doors
on December 1985. Approximately 200-250 Chinese women were
displaced as a result. A long struggle for unemployment
benefits and retraining funds followed. For more information
on the P & L workers struggle, refer to Appendix H.
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fiscal year.15  It is important to note that the banking
skills taught to these workers entail "back office" services,
e.g., data entry, counting checks and key punching. The
retraining efforts for the displaced garment workers indicate
an obvious shift from their participation in manufacturing to
potential new roles in the service economy. However, the jobs
which these workers are being trained for are low wage and
typically the most "deskilled" service sector jobs. As Sassen-
Koob (1984) observed in her research of labor force
participation in the New York and Los Angeles service
economies,
An examination of the job supply in high-tech industries
shows a massive expansion in low wage assembly line jobs,
most not unionized and held by immigrant or native minority
women. (Sassen-Koob, 1984: 149)
As noted earlier, while the precise nature of the jobs that
will be created by the parcel to parcel linkage project are not
determined yet, the following is an outline of the possible
jobs and wages created by an office tower and hotel.
15 Phone conversation with Terri Oshiro, Program Director
of the Workers Assistance Center in Boston Chinatown, 4/10/87.
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Entry Level Wacge
Managerial/Administrative
Financial Managers
General Managers & Top Executives
Professional, Paraprofessional
and Technical
Accountants and Auditors
Buyers & Purchasing Agents
Computer Programmers
Systems Analysts
Clerical and Administrative
Support
Billing, Cost & Rate Clerks
Bookkeeping, Accting. & Auditing
Clerks
Computer Operators
Data Entry Keyers
Duplicating Machine Operators
General Office Clerks
Mail Clerks
Messengers
Order Clerks
Payroll & Timekeeping Clerks
Procurement Clerks
Receptionists
Secretaries
Stock Clerks
Clerical Admin. Support
Switchboard Operators
Typists
Typists, Word Processing
Service
Guards & Watch Guards
Janitors & Cleaners (excluding maids
and house cleaners)
Supervisors & Mgrs. - Service
$20,000 - $32,000
$25,000 - $35,000
$15,000
$15,000
$18,000
$21,600
$22,000
$20,000
$20,000
$25,000
$10,400 - $13,520
$11,700 - $15,600
$12,480 - $14,300
$10,920 - $11,960
$10,400 - $13,000
$10,400 - $13,000
$10,400 - $11,960
$9,360 - $12,480
$10,400 - $13,000
$11,440 - $14,560
$10,400 - $11,700
$11,700 - $14,300
$8,944 - $13,650
$13,000 - $18,200
$10,608 - $11,700
$9,360 - $12,480
$10,920 - $13,000
$9,880 -
$8,320 -
$14,560 -
$12,480
$10,400
$20,800
Hotels and Food Service
Bartenders
Baggage Porters
Bellhops
Cooks
Doormen
$11,856
$5,200
$5,200
$13,350
$5,200
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occupation
Occupation
Hotels and Food Service (cont'd)
Elevator Operators
Kitchen Workers (food preparation)
Hotel Clerks
Host/Hostesses
Housekeepers
Maids
Waiters/Waitresses
Waiters/Waitresses' Assistants
Sales
Cashiers
Sales Counter Clerks
Sales Workers
Entry Level Wage
$11,856
$8,320
$11,856
$12,480
$10,400
$10,400
$5,200
$4,160
$10,400
$10,400
$8,840
SOURCE: Data from DES report "Analysis of Employment Trends in
the Boston Service Delivery Area", Boston Hotel Workers and
Bartenders Union, Local 26 and Boston Globe Help Wanted Ads,
April 26, 1987.
The minority development proposals do not specify the
precise nature nor number of jobs to be allocated to community
residents. The proposals merely echo the BRA promise of job
creation and economic revitalization of Chinatown and Roxbury.
However, given the socioeconomic constraints of the community
residents and the direction of current retraining efforts,
Chinatown and Roxbury workers will be channeled to occupy the
lower stratum of the office occupational hierarchy
characterized by low wages and lack of opportunity for job
advancement. Essentially, the secondary labor market status of
community workers will not improved by the parcel to parcel
linkage projects.
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The jobs that will be available to Chinatown and Roxbury
residents are typically what Gordon (1972) describes as
"menial, requiring little mental or physical dexterity", "low
wages and conferred minimal status", "quality of working
conditions are poor", "completely isolated and not connected to
job ladders of any sort." (Gordon, 1972: 45) In short, the
jobs that are accessible to Chinatown and Roxbury workers
merely reinforce their concentration in the secondary labor
market. Moreover, based on the P & L workers experience, there
is great concern whether the retrained workers will be
qualified to obtain even menial service jobs. Janet Bugoslaw,
Program Manager at the Industrial Services Program which funds
retraining programs for dislocated workers, indicated that the
P & L workers will have difficulty accessing any service job
due to their limited english speaking skills. Furthermore, she
expressed doubt that the workers will be able to gain
employment that pays more than $5.25 per hour or an annual
income of $10,920.16
PARCEL TO PARCEL LINKAGE JOB CREATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY
In addition to job creation, the parcel to parcel linkage
project is expected to generate $2 million dollars in job
training funds. Job training will prepare community residents
to access the new jobs. However, the types of jobs that
16 Meeting with Janet Bugoslaw, Program Manager at the
Industrial Services Program on April 28, 1987.
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community residents will be trained for will not substantially
impact their current socioeconomic status. Chinatown and
Roxbury workers will be re-circulated within the secondary
labor market of the new service economy. As Harrison (1972)
contends,
(E)valuations of conventional private and public sector
employment manpower training programs have show that the
jobs for which ghetto dwellers are trained in these
programs tend to resemble the very same unskilled, low wage
jobs which the trainees (or their peers) held in the past.
(Harrison, 1972: 21)
Equally important in a discussion of job training as a
strategy to improve the labor participation of Chinatown
workers is that the ideological and economic rationale for job
training is based on a specific conceptualization of the
operation of the labor market. It is imperative to recognize
that while training may be a pragmatic method to teach new job
skills, training as a solution to overcoming job barriers refer
to a particular understanding of labor force participation
which ignores structural barriers to employment and
individualizes one's ability to access certain jobs.
Job training is centered around improving the skills or
"human capital" of individuals. Human capital theory proposes
that people are in low productivity jobs because they lack
skills and education. In effect, these workers are blamed for
their inability to access high paying jobs since it is assumed
that their exclusion from good jobs is due to their lack of the
appropriate credentials. The solution to remedying
unemployment or underemployment is then to invest in the human
83
capital of low wage or unemployed workers through extensive
training.
The human capital approach to resolving problems of
unemployment and poverty is based on certain assumptions about
the operation of the labor market. Most importantly, is the
assumption that perfectly competitive markets exist. According
to neoclassical economic theory, a perfect market is
characterized by rationality, competition, access to full
information and maximizing behavior. Structural barriers to
employment such as racism and sexism are dismissed as
externalities. Thus, human capital theory "maintains the
assumption of perfect markets while focusing on the
heterogeneity of the labor force in explaining wage and
employment differentials." (Malveaux, 1984: 101) In other
words, human capital theory identifies the personal attributes
of laborers as the source of the problems. The supply of labor
rather than the inequities of the market becomes the object of
reform.
Moreover, evaluations of manpower training programs which
proliferated during the 1960's has claimed that these training
programs often failed in their objective to secure well paying
employment for training recipients. Although it is beyond the
scope of this study to detail the findings of such studies, it
is sufficient to cite Harrison's (1972) observation of the
impact of training on the labor status of ghetto workers,
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I have found that the opportunity costs to ghetto residents
of undertaking such individualistic actions as investments
in education and training are much higher than has ever
been suspected heretofore. Indeed, in many cases, these
investments have had no statistically significant payoff at
all. (emphasis added) (Harrison, 1972: viii)
Equally as critical in assessing the effectiveness of job
training as a strategy to improve the labor participation of
workers is whether training actually enables workers to access
better jobs. In the case of the P & L workers, there are no
guarantees as to the placement of retrained workers in new
jobs. The training program representatives have agreed that
they will try to place approximately 60% - 70% of the retrained
workers. In addition, representatives from the city and state
have verbally consented to place the remaining trained workers.
However, as of yet, there is no way to enforce these agreements
and thus, job placement remains a tenuous aspect of job
training programs.
CONCLUSION
The parcel to parcel linkage project is anticipated to
create approximately 4,000 permanent jobs for Chinatown and
Roxbury respectively. Before this project can be upheld as a
model for community economic development, it is necessary to
frame the project within Boston's overall economic context.
Based on the national and local economic trends, it is quite
clear that the objective of the parcel to parcel linkage
project is to service the economic restructuring efforts of
Boston, both spatially and economically.
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The parcel to parcel linkage project based on developing
office towers and initiating commercial activities will
certainly create jobs. However, it is necessary to examine the
true nature of service sector employment opportunities and the
ability of community residents to obtain these jobs before this
project can be upheld as a model for local economic
development. This section has discussed several studies which
conclude that the majority of jobs within the service sector
are low wage and low skill. Within the existing socioeconomic
status of Chinatown and Roxbury residents based on structural
constraints as defined by race and ethnicity, class, sex and
the segmented labor market, to conclude that these residents
will access only those jobs which are low wage and low skill is
realistic.
The job linkage funds will be directed toward retraining
programs oriented to preparing the labor force to undertake low
level service jobs. The strategy to incorporate community
residents in the emerging service economy rests with the
prospect of endowing them with the human capital or skills to
continue to service the professional/managerial sectors. These
funds will be utilized to guarantee the necessary pool of
janitors, food service workers, and clerical workers. However,
the Chinatown labor force faces particular barriers to even
these low level jobs. The magnitude of non-english speaking
ability among the majority of Chinatown workers undermine the
BRA assumption that the jobs created by the Kingston-
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Bedford/Essex Street developments will "benefit" community
residents.
Although training is a necessary component of an employment
strategy for Chinatown workers, it is an insufficient solution
to the economic inequality experienced by these workers.
Training focuses only on the supply side of the labor market,
i.e., the workers. However, the barriers to employment for
workers of color are often a result of the demand side of the
labor market. A Boston Globe article on 1/29/84, described the
prevalence of discrimatory hiring practices among Boston
employers. Workers of color were "drastically underrepresented
in jobs ranging from department store managers to secretaries
in high-technology firms to janitors" and even in "jobs that
require minimum training and few specialized skills." (Boston
Globe, 1/29/84) The article cited a study conducted by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which demonstrated that
Boston ranked first among major U.S. cities whose workers of
color were overrepresented in low paying jobs.
The BRA strategies to remedy economic inequality and
"redistribute wealth" do not suffice nor do they adequately
address racist hiring practices which has historically excluded
workers of color from "good" jobs. The parcel to parcel
linkage project guidelines do not specify what types of jobs or
how many jobs will be accessible to community workers. The BRA
has not identified any affirmative action goals for the parcel
to parcel linkage project job creation agenda. In addition,
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the BRA has not specified how the parcel to parcel linkage
project is to comply with the Boston Residents, Boston Jobs
ordinance. In sum, the objective of the project to improve the
economic viability of Chinatown and Roxbury residents is a
contestable point. Essentially, the question which emerges
from this analysis is who benefits from the parcel to parcel
linkage project?
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CHAPTER V
STRATEGIES FOR REDISTRIBUTING WEALTH
INTRODUCTION
The objective of the parcel to parcel linkage project to
share downtown wealth with local communities is indeed an
ambitious one and may even serve as a model for "socially
conscious" development. However, the proposed strategies to
achieve this redistribution of wealth, as presently stated in
the BRA guidelines and minority development proposals, are at
best, incomplete. According to the BRA, minority participation
and equity sharing are the primary strategies to reallocate
downtown wealth. Community residents benefit from linkage fees
which will strengthen the infrastructure of the Chinatown and
Roxbury neighborhood economies by providing affordable housing
and job training programs.
This chapter will focus specifically on job creation and
training as two proposed methods to share downtown wealth with
community residents. In order to assess the potential of
office tower based job creation to transform the socioeconomic
status of community workers, it is necessary to review how the
labor force participation of Chinatown workers will be impacted
by the emergence of a service economy. The framework of
training to facilitate the transition to these new jobs will
also be discussed. Based on the secondary labor market nature
of the majority of service sector jobs, this chapter will
89
discuss how training, alone, does not suffice as a solution to
economic inequality.
The struggle for community-based economic development is
centered around who controls the land, labor and capital of a
community. The parcel to parcel linkage effort to redistribute
wealth does not constitute community-based economic
development, in part, because the proposed strategies to share
wealth do not reallocate control or resources to the
communities. The concept of community control is essential in
the development of a neighborhood economy which serves the
interests of community residents and ensures the long-term
viability of a community. In sum, the parcel to parcel linkage
project falls short of achieving its objective since the
transfer of wealth or control over resources does not take
place.
This chapter will explore two alternative or rather
supplementary strategies which will contribute towards the
parcel to parcel linkage objective: unions and workers
cooperatives. Unions and workers cooperatives are based on
organizing workers to leverage greater control over their
labor. Unions and workers cooperatives are institutions which
challenge the unequal relation between labor and capital since
they serve as mechanisms to advance and protect workers rights
and interests. This chapter will discuss how unions and
workers cooperatives will instill a viable avenue for community
ownership and control over two important elements of a
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neighborhood economy - labor and capital and thereby, a true
process of redistribution of wealth will begin.
TRAINING
The BRA estimates that approximately 4,000 permanent jobs
will be created by the parcel to parcel linkage projects for
Chinatown and Roxbury, respectively. Approximately 40% of the
jobs are professional/managerial jobs while the remaining are
support service occupations and thus, readily accessible to
retrained community workers. The job linkage fund will provide
the resources to train community people to access these new
service jobs. The P & L workers experience demonstrates how
the Chinatown labor force, characterized predominantly by non-
english speaking immigrants presently employed in restaurants
and garment factories, are being prepared by training programs
to make the transition from low skill manufacturing jobs to
low skill service jobs. William Tabb in his book, The
Political Economy of the Black Ghetto (1970) observed that the
experience of the 1960's Manpower Development and Training
Program,
received popular approval, in part, because education and
training seem to be ways to 'help the poor help themselves'
and partly because training in this program has rarely been
tied to job openings where blacks can compete with whites,
after they are trained, for desirable positions. (emphasis
added) (Tabb, 1970: 122)
In effect, Chinatown and Roxbury workers are being trained for
jobs which other workers, notably white workers, do not want.
In light of the nature of service sector jobs, a key question
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then emerges from the P & L experience, is it plausible that
these workers' socioeconomic status will substantially improve
as food service workers, clerical workers, key punchers, and
daycare workers? This concern posed in a more positive way is:
given the existing socioeconomic constraints of Chinatown
workers, are the linkage funds being utilized to maximize the
human capital of Chinatown workers?
The impact of current training programs on improving the
secondary labor market status of Chinatown workers is highly
questionable. Retraining workers to perform menial job
specific skills will minimally impact their access to "better"
jobs. Training, in this case, will merely recirculate some
workers within the secondary labor market by transferring these
workers from declining manufacturing industries to service
related industries while other workers may not be able to
access any service sector jobs. Essentially, training as
strategy to address the economic inequality experienced by
Chinatown workers is an incomplete solution for two reasons:
training does not penetrate the structural segmentation of the
labor force and secondly, the limited scope of the proposed
training does not fully develop potential human capital.
Chapter One described how the labor market functions as two
distinct markets: the secondary and primary market. The
allocation of workers to each of the segments is a dynamic
process shaped to a large degree by the racial and sexual
division of labor. Segmented labor market theory highlights
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how the economic structure operates systematically to divide
laborers. The qualitative social and economic returns to
workers vary greatly depending on their labor market status
since each segment is characterized by a substantial disparity
in wages, work conditions, stability, work activity, and skill
requirements. If the barriers to accessing the primary labor
market is institutionalized and inter-segment mobility is
highly restricted, training as a solution to economic
inequality is essentially insufficient. Training reforms
individual workers and not a labor market whose operation is
based, in part, on the racial and sexual division of labor.
A further elaboration on the constraints of job training as
a strategy to redistribute wealth is the limitations of
training to fully develop the potential human capital of
people. While training will teach individuals new job skills,
the widely accepted approach of training programs is to teach
job-specific skills. Therefore, since the majority of service
jobs that will be created by the parcel to parcel linkage
projects are low skill, the BRA claim that these jobs will
allow workers to transcend traditional work conditions is
highly unlikely. Because the service jobs that will be
available to workers are characteristically secondary labor
market jobs, to train workers to access these new jobs is to
define training as limited to transferring specific minimal job
specific skills. Furthermore, the jobs that workers will be
prepared for do not have internal labor markets, i.e.,
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potential for advancement, this projection coupled with the
fact that the transferability of their new skills are probably
limited leads to the conclusion that training will,
essentially, reinforce their secondary labor market status.
Although training may be a pragmatic approach to
transferring marketable skills to workers who are constrained
by education, language, time, etc., to pose training,
especially for low level service jobs, alone as a strategy to
redistribute wealth to community people is a deception.
Therefore, in an effort to address some of the
institutionalized barriers to employment for workers of color,
the BRA must minimumally agree to and fulfill affirmative
action goals, e.g., 100% job placement upon retraining.
STRATEGIES FOR REDISTRIBUTING WEALTH
In light of the socioeconomic constraints of the Chinatown
labor force and the limits of training as a tool to improve the
labor market status of these workers, this section will discuss
two possible strategies to supplement the job creation and
training agenda of the parcel to parcel linkage project.
Unions and workers cooperatives make important contributions to
building a neighborhood economy and thus, should be integrated
as strategies to redistributing wealth to local communities.
In a most fundamental way, unions and workers cooperatives
redefine a relationship between labor and capital characterized
by the expropriation of surplus labor from workers in the form
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of profits. To address economic inequality is a necessary
aspect to any development process intended to redistribute
wealth to community people. However, to have a long lasting
impact on economic inequality, the parcel to parcel linkage
plan needs to address building community based institutions
which will develop human capital and begin to reappropriate the
wealth created by workers. In effect, any efforts to
redistribute wealth to truly reform economic inequality and not
merely to perpetuate a dependence on benevolent state policies
centered around a "trickle down" approach of sharing wealth
must incorporate forms of worker and community control.
UNIONS
In their simplest form, unions are advocates for workers
rights. Unions organize workers to leverage for higher wages,
better work conditions and fair treatment. Workers interests
are represented by unions which also serve to protect them from
exploitation and abuse. Unionization can increase wages as
evidenced in the experience of Boston hotel workers where
unionized wage scales are at least one dollar more per hour
than non-unionized entry level wages. 1 7
Labor market segmentation theory demonstrates that access
to the primary labor market is primarily through educational
credentials, notably a college degree. While obtaining a
17 Conversation with representative from Boston Local 26
Hotel Workers and Bartenders Union on April 17, 1987.
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college education is an unrealistic objective for many
Chinatown workers, the presence of unions can successfully
improve working conditions and earnings by instituting certain
features of primary labor market jobs, namely job stability and
security. Thus, the introduction of unions in typically "bad"
jobs may serve to transform these jobs into better jobs. In
effect, unions, as a strategy for collective action, will serve
as an organizing tool to leverage greater worker control for
better wages and work conditions and moreover, institute job
ladders for possible advancement.
It is widely known that the labor movement in the United
States has a long and scarred history. Exclusion of people of
color and women in unions is not an uncommon occurrence. Among
workers of color, the concept of unions being white
protectionist organizations which have little to offer to
workers of color is unfortunately, often a legitimate
perception. Thus, the viability of unions as an advocate for
workers of color must be evaluated carefully. Often, the
receptiveness to unionization must be cultivated in a case by
case approach. Given the success of workers struggles,
Watsonville Cannery Workers in Los Angelos and the P & L
Garment Workers in Boston Chinatown to name but two, labor
struggles must be based in community organizing. Since the
parcel to parcel linkage jobs will be in the communities, the
conditions are appropriate for community-based labor organizing
and unionization. However, due to past experiences with
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unions, conscious efforts must be made to incorporate workers
of color in positions of leadership. In addition, anti-racist
policies and standards must be enforced.
The trends and characteristics of a service economy
provide an environment which make unions a viable strategy for
worker control. The service economy, as witnessed by the
parcel to parcel linkage project, tends toward spatial
centralization. Furthermore, many service occupations are
unlikely to be outsourced or relocated since they are based on
direct human interaction, e.g., waiters/waitresses,
receptionists, and hotel clerks. Workers can, in effect, exert
additional leverage for the threat of companies shutting down
or moving away is highly unfeasible.
Another feature of the Boston economy which enhances the
viability of unionization is the current tight labor market. A
Boston Globe article dated 4/19/87, "Downtown Firms Cite Lack
of Clerical Help", cites an office survey completed by the BRA
which found that 79% of employers in the financial district
have difficulties locating and hiring secretaries and clerical
workers. The shortage of labor enhances the leverage that
organized workers can exert on employers for better wages and
benefits. In sum, the pressure toward spatial agglomeration of
service industries provide an setting where all workers are
centrally located and more importantly, organized efforts due
to a tight labor market can indeed bear substantial impact on
the operation of the service economy.
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Unionization is a viable strategy to redistribute wealth to
community workers and should be incorporated in the parcel to
parcel linkage project job creation and training agenda.
Important sectors of the Boston downtown economy such as
construction and hotels are already organized. In addition,
there is great potential to organize clerical and sales
workers. Unions, such as Boston Local 26 Hotel Workers and
Bartenders Union, should be encouraged to participate in the
parcel to parcel linkage training programs. Their role can be
to inform workers of their rights and to educate workers about
unions and labor history. Union membership should be
encouraged upon job placement. By presenting opportunities
where unions can outreach to workers and encourage them to
become members will greatly enhance the long term strategy for
economic equality.
WORKERS COOPERATIVES
Workers cooperatives, first introduced in 1956, were
granted legal status in Massachusetts in 1982 when Chapter 157A
was added to the Massachusetts General Laws. Workers
cooperatives are worker owned and controlled businesses and as
such, they fundamentally transform the relation between labor
and capital. Unlike traditional relations between workers and
employers, workers cooperatives are based on a labor theory of
property which states "people should have the rights to the
(positive and negative) fruits of their labor". The
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underlying principle of the labor theory of property proposes
that "those who invest labor, not those who invest capital, are
entitled to profits the enterprise generates." (ICA) Thus,
profits and decision making power are shared equally among all
workers and not just management and capitalists.
According to the Industrial Cooperative Association (ICA),
a consulting group based in Somerville, Massachusetts, there
are presently two hundred worker-owned cooperatives of which
the majority employ fewer than 50 workers. Workers
cooperatives are similar to small businesses as both types of
enterprises face the same risks, most notably, failure rates.
The failure rate for all small businesses is 80% within the
first five years of operation. (ICA, p.2) Therefore, in ICA
consultations with workers who are interested in buying out
plants faced with closure and setting up a worker cooperative,
ICA seeks three of the following six factors before
recommending employee takeover:
1) Leadership: a person(s) who can provide entrepreneurial and
management experience 2) Market and product: Is there a
market for the products? 3) Capital Needs: a) how capital
intensive will the new business be? b) how much money is
available for the new enterprise from workers and private and
public financial institutions? 4) Assets for sale: equipment,
inventory, patents, plant, etc. 5) Skill base of workforce 6)
Time: limited time is a factor in plant closings but not
necessarily establishing new workers cooperatives. (ICA, p.3)
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Training can assist in fulfilling at least three of the
above factors for a successful workers cooperative. Training
oriented towards developing the potential human capital of
workers rather than transferring menial job-specific skills,
can educate workers about workers cooperatives and/or unions
and teach the necessary skills to participate in a workers
cooperatives, e.g., basic marketing, accounting, and business
skills.
An important aspect of the BRA guidelines for the economic
revitalization of Chinatown and Roxbury is the channeling of a
portion of the profits generated by the parcel to parcel
linkage projects toward entrepreneurial development in the
communities. The establishment of small minority owned
businesses will stimulate new economic activity in the
communities. Each of the minority development proposals has
included provisions for a venture capital fund for small
business development. This resource can provide in part, the
necessary capital for setting up workers cooperative.
In order to truly redistribute wealth in an empowering
manner which affects the greatest number of community people
possible, the venture capital fund should not be focused merely
on facilitating the development of existing small businesses in
the communities. Rather, workers cooperatives are a viable and
powerful way to stimulate economic development which truly
redistributes wealth to community workers by generating long-
term employment. Therefore, a portion, if not all, of the
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venture capital funds should be directed toward the creation of
workers cooperatives.
Workers cooperatives, presented as small businesses, will
greatly enhance community and financial institutions'
receptivity. Workers cooperatives in a service economy
conceivably can transform the nature of low wage, low skill
jobs. Sassen-Koob (1984) notes that,
All the various components of high-income gentrification
are labor intensive: residential building attendants,
workers productivity producing services or goods for
specialty shops and gourmet food shops, dog walkers, errand
runners, cleaners of all sorts, and so on. (Sassen-Koob,
1984: 157)
However, if the relation between workers and employers can be
redefined in a way where workers can share profits and
decision-making, i.e., workers exert control over their labor
power, workers can then benefit from employment in an
empowering way. In effect, the parcel to parcel linkage
projects, centered around the extension of the downtown economy
to local communities, can, in fact, redistribute wealth if
institutions based on worker control are included in the plans.
Workers cooperatives are also an employment alternative for
those workers who are less likely to make the transition from
manufacturing industries to service related industries. There
are many successful examples of sewing cooperatives in the
United States. The Rainbow Workers Cooperative is owned by 32
former garment worker employees of the Sierra Designs Company
in Oakland, California. Threatened by the company's decision
to shut down, the employees organized and were able to get
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financial assistance from the state and city government to set
up a workers cooperative. While the manufacturing industry in
Boston is rapidly disappearing, the current Boston market is
quite receptive to specialty items such as crafts and tailored
made items. Although the feasibility of a sewing cooperative
needs further exploration, it suffices to say that workers
cooperatives are a viable alternative for Chinatown given, in
part, the vitality of the Boston economy.
REDISTRIBUTING WEALTH FOR COMMUNITY CONTROL
This study was based on an analysis of the BRA parcel to
parcel linkage project with a specific focus on its self-
proclaimed objective to share downtown wealth with Chinatown
and Roxbury. This analysis noted the primary method of
"sharing the wealth" is the extension of office development
into the local communities. Job linkage funds will prepare
community workers for the new office tower based jobs. While
parcel to parcel linkage project will direct substantial
reinvestment in Chinatown and Roxbury, it remains questionable
whether the communities will benefit at all from this project.
The doubt surrounding the revitalization efforts of the
parcel to parcel linkage project is best framed by Mauricio
Gaston and Marie Kennedy's distinction between neighborhood and
community as discussed in their paper, "Capital Investment or
Community Development? The Struggle for Control of Turf by
Boston's Black and Latino Community." (1986) According to
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Gaston and Kennedy (1986), a neighborhood is treated as a
collection of commodities i.e., its land and buildings can be
bought and sold in the market. A community is comprised of
people (residents) and embodies cultural norms and social
relations. While a community can not be commodified, its
physical and spatial dimensions are treated as commodities and
thus, can be destroyed, rebuilt, and upgraded. In this
respect, investment and development within a capitalist society
are about maximizing the potential value or the "highest and
best use" of a community's land and buildings. The human
element of a neighborhood is often neglected. Following this
development tradition, the parcel to parcel linkage project
"has the potential of destroying the community in order to save
the neighborhood." (Gaston and Kennedy, 1985: 51) While the
parcel to parcel linkage projects will transform and "upgrade"
the physical attributes of the Chinatown and Roxbury
neighborhood, this development effort is not intended to
benefit primarily community people and in fact, will
potentially displace many of them.
The critical distinction in redistributing wealth as
prescribed by the parcel to parcel linkage project and
redistributing wealth to rebuild neighborhood economies is who
will ultimately control the land, labor and capital? The
answer to this question indicates, in part, who ultimately
benefits from development. As Bennett Harrison (1974) points
out,
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Public and private programs aimed at developing the economy
of the urban ghetto differ significantly along several
dimensions especially control and power. (emphasis added)
(Harrison, 1974: 12)
The parcel to parcel linkage project combines public and
private resources, however, the dimensions of control and power
are not allocated to community residents but are concentrated
in the hands of an elite which the parcel to parcel linkage
project has expanded to include minority capitalists. Minority
equity participation does not constitute redistributing wealth
to Chinatown and Roxbury. The redistribution of wealth must
take greater form than merely initiating private capital into
the communities. Gaston and Kennedy (1986) point out the
difference between investment and development,
Investment can be defined as simply the influx of capital
into an area. Development is far more complex and
important, for it involves people, their increased capacity
for productivity, an increase in the level of control over
their own lives, their level of organization as well as
their access to wealth. (emphasis added) (Gaston and
Kennedy, 1986: 6)
Essentially, the missing elements of the parcel to parcel
linkage project, which ultimately undermine its objective to
redistribute wealth, is the lack of community control over the
development process and the lack of community-based institution
building which will facilitate community people's access to
wealth.
Community participation, in the tradition BRA planning
fashion, is confined to negotiating over details such as
allocation of community "benefits" and review of the minority
development team proposals. To identify the minority
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development team as the mechanism for community control is to
co-opt a minority elite whose class interests are more
compatible with the BRA's than the community's. The minority
development team as the process for community control will
reinforce the "top-down" approach of city planning. As
Marjaleena Repo argues in her article, "The Fallacy of
'Community Control'" (1984),
The solutions advocated are merely exhortations about
'people taking power in their own communities', people
'participating in decisions affecting their lives,' etc.,
without the slightest analysis being provided as to what it
takes for people to assume control over their own lives.
(Repo, 1984: 59)
The strategies recommended, unions and workers
cooperatives, can easily be incorporated into the parcel to
parcel linkage plans. The presence of these institutions in
the communities will begin to address the redistribution of
wealth by transferring power and control to community workers.
Unions and workers cooperatives contribute to the development
of a neighborhood economy because they are based on worker
control over two important elements of an economy; labor and
capital. As David P. Ellerman, member of the Industrial
Cooperative Association contends,
A worker cooperative is integrated into the local
community; it is not a piece of property manipulated to
maximize the return to absentee owners. Local control is
established over the amount and structure of capital
investment.
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In effect, to build the neighborhood economies of Chinatown and
Roxbury is to lay the foundation necessary for community
control over land, labor and capital. The parcel to parcel
linkage projects succeeds in channeling millions of dollars
into the communities, however, as Gaston and Kennedy (1985)
argue, this flood of private capital can potentially result in
massive displacement. With unionization and workers
cooperatives, the institutionalization of community control is
partially accomplished as wealth and power is redistributed
more equitably among all community residents.
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CONCLUSION
The parcel to parcel linkage project is an ambitious and
complex multimillion dollar public-private partnership endeavor
which potentially transforms the Chinatown and Roxbury
communities. Upon completion of the project, a 40 or so story
office tower will dominate across the street from Chinatown.
The community will witness the South End phenomenon as
boutiques, cafes, card shops and gourmet grocery stores
eventually take over the Chinese markets, fruit stands and
coffee shops.
The parcel to parcel linkage concept raises serious concerns
regarding the ramifications of public-private partnerships
which encourage private sector reinvestment in low-income
communities of color. The revitalization of Chinatown and
Roxbury is based on Boston's new economic role as an emerging
global city. The pressure to expand and consolidate the growth
of financial and administrative activities in the central
business district is impacting the communities which
immediately surround it. The parcel to parcel linkage project
proposes to "share" downtown wealth by restructuring the
economic and social functions of Chinatown and Roxbury to
accommodate Boston's growing service economy.
The Kingston-Bedford and Essex Street developments will
absorb the increasing pressure on the downtown economy. The
impact of this project on Chinatown will extend beyond mere
physical transformation of the urban environment. These
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developments will generate low wage service jobs which the BRA
are presenting to the community as jobs to increase incomes and
restimulate the neighborhood economy. However, the true nature
of service jobs undermine the BRA claim that service sector job
opportunities will redistribute wealth to community people.
The P & L workers experience raises additional concerns
regarding the transition to service employment. Retraining as
a strategy to prepare workers to access service sector jobs is
inadequate for the majority of non-english speaking workers.
The job placement projections for the P & L workers are
pessimistic and furthermore, the entry wages for those workers
that will be placed, certainly do not signify an increase in
wealth or incomes.
The parcel to parcel linkage project is upheld as an
innovative approach to community development as millions of
dollars of public funds and private investment is channeled
into the communities. The economic development approach of the
parcel to parcel linkage program defines the revitalization of
Chinatown and Roxbury in ways that will enable these
communities to further service the growth of private capital.
Essentially, parcel to parcel linkage will not stimulate
community-based economic development as much as it will
facilitate the dominance of downtown economy like activities in
the communities. The answer to the question which has guided
this inquiry, who benefits from the parcel to parcel linkage
project, is, ultimately, private capital. The city and state
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by contributing approximately 100 million dollars in this
project, is, in effect, subsidizing the growth of private
capital. The parcel to parcel linkage project enables a few
minority elite to be beneficiaries as the minority developers
will most certainly become millionaires and a hand full of
minority business entrepreneurs become richer. Essentially,
the redistribution of wealth is not so much a "redistribution"
but a further concentration of wealth in the hands of private
capital which, in the case of parcel to parcel linkage, extends
to a few minority elite.
The recommended strategies toward redistributing wealth for
community-based economic development outlined in Chapter V were
presented based on the assumption that the parcel to parcel
linkage project will proceed toward completion. However, an
equally viable and possibly more powerful strategy to
redistribute wealth is the strategy that has been undertaken by
the Greater Roxbury Neighborhood Authority (GRNA). The GRNA
publicly rejected the parcel to parcel linkage project and has
developed alternative plans for the Parcel 18 site which
includes light manufacturing to utilize existing job skills
among community residents. The GRNA as a community-based
organization can potentially disrupt the parcel to parcel
linkage process as the organization successfully proceeds with
its June 13, 1986 law suit against the city for negotiating in
bad faith. This law suit resulted in a preliminary injunction
issued on July 3, 1986 against any disposition of land in
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Roxbury including Parcel 18.
The GRNA exerts organized political power which the BRA must
contend with and thus, the GRNA is successfully implementing
community control over the development process as defined by
the city, state, and private sector. Furthermore, the GRNA
rejects the BRA method of community participation. The GRNA
refuses to negotiate over community benefits and the size and
scale of the project development. In other words, the GRNA has
refused to accept the BRA defined terms of community
development and will not participate in an essentially "no win"
situation. In sum, the GRNA strategy is a proactive approach
for it challenges and redefines the BRA concept of community
input.
The potential for Chinatown to organize and generate similar
political leverage is unlikely for many reasons. However, the
opportunity exists for the Chinatown community to build a
political alliance with the GRNA to collectively organize a
community-based response to the parcel to parcel linkage
project. The city has "linked" the fate of Chinatown and
Roxbury in an manner which is potentially divisive. The
financial linkage of the parcel to parcel linkage project, the
underlying force of the project, has created a dialectic which
contends that Chinatown must tolerate the largest possible
office tower in order that Roxbury receives the greatest amount
of community benefits. The city has defined the relationship
between these two communities to exploit the tensions regarding
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the project in a manner which diffuses anger at the city. The
city-defined relationship misdirects conflict as Chinatown and
Roxbury battle each other in negotiations. Thus, it is
critical that Chinatown engage in dialogue with the Roxbury
community to build a coalition and begin to redefine the terms
in which the two communities must interact. The potential
political alliance and the power which it can leverage over the
development process is the beginning of a strategy that truly
redistributes wealth.
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DESCRIPTION OF 9 KNAPP STREET DEVELOPMENT
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NINE KNAPP STREET
Project Description
Richard Ho, Trustee of the Knapp Trust proposes the redevelopment
of 9-23 Knapp Street, Boston to thirty five residential
condominiums.
The subject building is a six-storey red brick building with
basement built in the early 1900's. Each floor contains about
4700 square feet of space currently used for commercial and light
manufacturing purposes. This building features large arch windows
and arch entrances.
There will be six condominium apartments per floor, ranging in
sizes from 500 to over 700 square feet. All units will have one
or two bedrooms, living room, modern kitchen and bath, washer and
dryer hook-up. Where heights allowed, loft will be provided above
kitchen and bath. Wood beams and interior brick work are to be
exposed where possible, in order to best effect unique design
features of each apartment. Top floor units may have skylights to
lighten the apartments.
The first
handicapped
vestibule w
observing al
the residen
door.
floor will be designed to accomodate access for the
persons. The lobby will be provided with a secure
ith an intercom and a security television camera
1 entrances. The TV security system will be tied to
ts' apartment to let owners observe who is at the
A new 5000 pound oil hydraulic elevator
new two hour rated shaft. Two means of
with concrete on-fill metal stairs.
will be installed in a
egress will be provided
The exterior masonry will be chemically cleaned. Street amenities
will include brick paving for sidewalks, bollards along the curb
line, street trees, and historic type street lamps.
Each unit
and will
Sprinkler
as well as
will be provided with an air to air heat pump system
be separatelymetered with meters centrally located.
Alarm system will be installed throughout the building
emergency lightings.
Roof decks will be provided
planter area.
to tenants as outdoor space and
1
Neighborhood Description
The subject building is located at the intersection of
street and Knapp street in the vincinity of Chinatown,
England Medical Center and Tuft Medical Center.
Kneel and
New
This location is at walking distance from all major districts of
Boston such as the Government Center, Financial District,
theatre district, South Station, Boston Common, waterfront area
and Park square. Public parking garage is few steps away from
this building. Accesses to all major expressways such as the Mass
Pike, Southeast Expressway, and Expressway North are only couple
blocks away.
A lot of major developments are being undertaken in this
neighborhood such as the Transportation Building, the Lafayette
Place, Four Season Place, South Station Redevelopment,
International Trade center, Rowes Wharf, China Trade Center, Wang
Center and One Financial Tower. The Chinatown neighborhood is
famous for its abundance of special restaurants and shops.
The rapid diminishing
neighborhood makes th
commercial and resident
of the Boston
is area even
ial purposes.
Combat Zone
more desirable
from this
for both
2
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APPENDIX D
MINORITY DEVELOPMENT TEAM MEMBERS
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BOSTON DEVELOPMENT COLLABORATIVE
I. TEAM COMPOSITION. A joint venture of the Asian American
Development Corp. and J. B. Hall Development Assoc.
Officers:
1. Arthur Wong, Chairman of Board. First president of
Wong Family Benevolent Assoc., Former Executive
Director, Chinese Merchants Assoc. Former Executive
Director, National Chinese Welfare Council; Chair
Vocational English Program; Founder CEDC; Executive
Director CCBA.
2. Arthur Gutierrez, Vice Chair. Former Executive Vice
President Spaulding & Slye Construction Co. Founder,
President, Gutierrez Co. Former Project Manager, Vice
President, Aberthau President, Construction Co. B.S.,
M.S. from M.I.T.
3. Juan Cofield, President and CEO. President, CEO,
Boston Realty Assoc.; Founder, director, president,
CEO, Boston Bank of Commerce; Vice President, Mass.
Board of Higher Education. Involvement in N.E. Home
for Little Wanderers, Coolidge Corner Community Corp.,
Rest Haven Nursing Home, Robert Forbes House.
MBA, Corporate Finance - Wharton BA in Business
Administration, U of North Carolina.
4. Edward T. T. Chiang, Executive Vice President.
Original Board Member CEDC; Former President Greater
Boston Chinese Cultural Assoc.; Former president of
N.E. Assoc. of Chinese professionals.
Currently President, technical manager of H20
Engineering Consulting Assoc., inc. Experience in
managing projects involving hydraulics, groundwater,
water resources management, waste water.
5. Bill Wong, Treasurer. Former director Liberty Bank.
Owner Kowloon Restaurant in Saugus.
Founder, past president CEDC. Past president Wong
Family Benevolent Assoc., Treasurer National Chinese
Merchants Assoc., Known for charitable work.
6. Pussell E. Hill, Vice President. CEO of R.E. Hill to
Co., Inc. Former faculty member, Institute for Real
Estate Management (N.Y.U.). Former director of Real
Estate, Harvard U. Directed development of Soldier
Fields Road. Member Long Range Planning Committee for
Harvard and Radcliffe. Director, Corporate Services at
Nixdorf Computer Corporation. Certified real estate
broker, Certified Property Manager. Member, Greater
Boston Real Estate Board; Institute for Real Estate
Management. Board of Directors, Metro North Private
Industry Council.
7. Robert Wong, Clerk. Longtime member South
Cove/Chinatown YMCA. Graduate U. of New Hampshire -
Hotel Administration. President of Wms. and Sons,
Management for 4 restaurants and an import/export
company.
8. Joseph S. K. Chou. Member CCBA Director Tai Tung
Village Tenants Assoc. Currently assistant director
for Drafting, New England Institute of Technology.
9. Vernon Patterson. Resident Architect of Westin Hotel,
Copley, Shawmut Bank of Boston Headquarters, Lahey
Clinic.
Owns Vernon Patterson Enterprises which is designing
Black Cultural Arts Center in Hartford. Degrees in
Landscape Development and Architecture.
Received Distinguished Linkage Award from Black
Achievers Program.
10. Robert Rovster. President, Enertech Systems Inc. an
engineering company that designs and implements energy
conservation and control technologies. Former
Executive V..P./Controller, Data Signal Corp. Founder,
President Lewis Latiimer Foundation of Cambridge.
Former Director ABCD. Founder, Black Corporate
Presidents of New England. Former Director, Treasurer,
National Assoc. of Black Manufacturers. Two terms as
Mass. Commissioner of Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen
(under Governors Sargent and Volpe).
11. Hwachii Lien. Investment banker with Liberty Bank.
Doctorate in Applied Mechanics. Honored in "American
Men and Women in Science". Active in international
trading. President Financial Services Inc. Board,
CEDC.
12. Hon (Frank) Kam. Engineer, Stone & Webster Engineering
Corp. Formerly with Chas. T. Main Enaineering Corp.
Consultant Centre Dailv News (N.Y. based)
13. Jane Center Edmonds. President, Jane C. Edmonds &
Assoc. (Human Resource Management). Former Chair MCAD.
Fdrmer Director, Boston Office of Intergovernmental
Relations. Member Board: Boston Chamber of Commerce;
Urban League of Eastern Mass; United Way. Recipient of
B.C. Law School Community Service Prize, awards from
Radcliffe Alumnae Assoc., 9 to 5, American Arbitration
Assoc., Assoc. for Affirmative Action Professionals.
14. Jerry Chin. Co-owners, treasurer, Moon Villa
Restaurant, Boston. Board of CCBA. Former Chair,
director, Tue Shing Chinese Opera, Kwong Kow Chinese
School Committee.
15. Henrv H. Szeto. Co-owner, manager Moon Villa
Restaurant. Council Member CCBA. President Chinese
Freemason.
16. James Cofield Jr. Former BRA Board Member, President
CEO Malmart Mortgage Co., Inc. Former consultant
Arthur D. Little. Former faculty member Stanford
Electrical Engineering. Director Mass. Assoc.
Realtors. Director, Executive Comm. Member Chamber of
Commerce, Chairman Audit Committee, Trustee WGBH
Educational Foundation; Chairman Roxse Homes, Inc., One
of Ten Outstanding Young Leaders 1980 (Jaycee Award).
17. Robert Wang. Active member of CEDC and Greater Boston
Chinese Cultural Assoc.
18. Brian Holloway. Offensive Tackle, New England
Patriots, BA in Economics, Stanford. Player Rep., NFL,
V.P. NFL Players Assoc. Key Speaker for Boston School
Volunteers.
19. Paul S. James. President, CEO, Solar Electrical
Construction Corp. Merber: Sportsmen's Tennis Club;
NAACP. Governor, Greater Boston Chapter of 'aional
Electrical Contractors Assoc.
20. Dick Gregorv. Comedian. Board of M.L.K. Center for
Nonviolence and Social Change; Southern Christian
Leadership Conference. Chairman, CEO, Dick Gregory
Health Enterprises Inc.
21. Donald Chen. Board CEDC. Teacher, Quincy School.
22. Jeffrey S. Humber, Jr. V.P., Municipal Finance Dept.,
Merrill Lynch. Former Deputy City Administrator,
Washington, D.C.; Former Director Finance ard Pevenue.
23. Edward N. Lui. Roard, CEDC. Business Consultant for
various companies, including Sally Ling's Restaurant;
Ldtus Travel Services; KWL International, Inc., Sallin
Finance >rp.
24. Yen Kai Mok. Owner, China Palace Restaurant, New
Bedford. Chairman, Mak's Enterprises.
25. Minh Tu. Owner Quangloi Jewelry Co. Manager Lu's
Realty Trust Co. President, Mass. Assoc. of Chinese
from Indochina.
26. Chuck 0. Fong. Owner, president, treasurer, three
restaurants - Golden Eagle Inn. Dragon Light
Restaurant, China Inn. Founder Soo Yuen Assoc.
(30,000 members).
27. Raymond Shih. President, Greater Boston Chinese
Cultural Assoc. MBA from Baruch College (N.Y.U.).
Project manager, statistician, operations research
analyst for U.S. Dept. of Transportation. Very
involved in local Chinese language schools. Former
principal of Central Mass. Chinese Language School.
No summaries available for the following principals:
Tang Tsung Chung James K. Wong
Crispus Attucks Fund Johnny Yee
Nie Jiann Wen Sandra Yee
David Wong Donald Chin
* Minority Business Development Foundation
* Minority Employment and Job Training Foundation
*(to be created)
COLUMBIA PLAZA ASSOCIATES
I. Team Composition
A joint venture of the Chinese Investment Limited
Partnership (CILP) and Ruggles-Bedford Associates, Inc.
(RBA). CILP is a partnership of the Chinese Investment
Group (CIG) and the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent
Association (CCBA). CIG is the general partner and a
Class A limited partner. CCBA is a Class C limited partner
(10 percent). RBA is a Massachusetts corporation with
Class A, B and C shareholders. A more detailed explanation
of the financial structure is attached.
CPA is managed by a Management Committee consisting of
3 members of RBA and three from CILP. The Management
Committee will interface with the Boston Redevelopment
Authority (BRA).
The principals of Columbia Plaza Associates are:
1. Boston Bank of Commerce, founded 1982, New England's
only FDIC, black-owned, commercial bank with $35M asset
base and a 30% return on investment. Ronald Homer, bank
president and CPA representative has extensive experience
in real estate lending to office buildings, shopping
centers and residential properties.
2. Edward W. Brice, Jr. General partner and/or principal
in real estate investment partnerships and corporations.
Educated at Harvard University and the Sloan School of
Management at M.I.T. He has offices in and resides in
Boston.
3. BWR Realty Associates, Inc. Real estate development
subsidiary of Budd, Wiley and Richlin, law offices, a
full service, minority controlled law firm. Attorney
Fletcher Wiley represents BWR in Columbia Plaza Associates.
4. Campana Development Associates was organized in 1986
by seven members of Boston's Hispanic community to insure
that interests of that community are incorporated into
Linkage Project I. Consuelo Thornell is Campana's managing
general partner and representative to CPA. She is
Vice-President of Bell Associates, a social
research/management think tank.
5. Laura Chan, Commonwealth of Massachusetts accountant
since 1983. Educated at Northeastern University, Director
of the Chinatown Center for the Arts and the Greater
Boston Big Sisters Association. Fluent in four languages.
6. Paul Chan Vice-President and Property Manager for L.E.
Smith Management Co. of Boston. Served DCA Development
Corp. as property manager. Served in the Republic of
China's Foreign Ministry in Taipai, Taiwan. Bachelor
of Law and Masters of Urban Affairs from the National
Chengchi University of Taipai, Boston University
respectively. A licensed real estate broker and a
certified property manager. Has served as development
consultant on many projects in the Chinese community.
7. Josephine Chen. Property Manager with Boston Financial
Management Company. Studied at Syracuse University.
Worked for the Chinese Delegation to the United Nations,
formerly a borker for Suto Brothers (security exchange).
8. Stanley Chen Civil Engineer, licensed general contractor
and real estate developer. Has developed residential
and commercial properties. Former Executive Director
of CAB, former Bonding Director of General and
Sub-contractor Associates of San Francisco. Former project
manager for nation's first urban renewal project; has
been involved with seven others since, totalling over
one billion dollars.
9. Jill Cheng. President of Cheng Tsui Company, book
publishers and distributors and Harrington Corner
Properties, a development and management firm. Educated
at Radcliffe College and Harvard Divinity School. Board
member of ABCD and the United Way of Massachusetts.
10. Frank Chin. President of CILP. Owner of a number of
restaurants and properties in downtown Boston. Public
sector experience in purchasing, pollution commission
and real estate. Actively involved in local and national
politics.
11. William Douglas Chin. Practices law in downtown Boston.
Manages real estate and small business practice, on Board
of Kwong Kow Chinese School, and USES. Governing Board
Member of Gee How Oak Tin Association.
12. Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA). A
non-profit organization in Chinatown comprised in turn
of other community and civic organizations representative
of the Chinatown neighborhood in Boston. The group
consists of community organization members, family
association members, business entities and individuas.
Some of their projects include land use planning and
housing development, job training and employment
counseling, and advocacy for community program and
services. The CCBA has establis ?d a Chinese Community
Service Center, and sponsored the development of Tai
Tung Village.
13. Cruz Development Co.. Principals John B. Cruz Jr., John
B Cruz, III. Currently owns approximately 700 units.
Has financing commitments on 200 additional units.
14. Dora Lee Hsiung. President, owner of Housing Design
(FIber Artistry and Design Firm). Member Boston Visual
Artist Union, Weavers Guild of Boston, Handweavers Guild
of America.
15. Robert Y.C. Hsiung. Licensed architect. Principal,
Vice-President and Director of Architectural Design for
Jung/Brannen Associates. Member AIA Society for College
and University Planning; National Trust for Historic
Preservation. Former Chair Chinese Arts Festical;
President Greater Boston Chinese Cultural Association.
16. Ann M. Huang. Librarian for John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Company Library. Founder, Advanced Electronics,
Inc. Volunteer fundraiser, South Cove Manor Nursing
Home.
17. Lena Lui Jung. Chemical engineer. Research and testing
for International Paper Co., Lexington Instruments and
GTE Labs. Former principal of Chinese Language School.
18. Yu Sing Jung. Co-founder/President/Principal-in-Charge
of Jung/Brennan Associates, Inc., architects and planners.
Served as Chairman of the CEDC Development Council Realty
Corp. Director of the Boston Bank of Commerce. Projects
include One Financial Center at Dewey Square, the World
Trade Center at Commonwealth Pier and 125 High Street.
19. Bertram M. Lee. Former President and Director of the
New England Television Corporation. Currently President
and Director of BML Associates, Inc. a diversified holding
company. General Partner of Albimar Communications,
Inc. and Mountaintop, Inc. Vice-Chairman of the Board
of Boston Bank of Commerce. Director of Shawmut
Corporation.
20. Chung M. Lee, AIA. President of the Boston Office of
Cannon Architects. Licensed architect in six states.
Formerly associate professor at Syracuse University.
Projects include Exchange Place, Marketplace Center and
the Four Seasons Hotel/Condominiums in Boston.
21 Thomas S.K. Liu, Ph.D. President Haley and Aldrich,
a 180 person consulting and engineering firm. Current
projects include 500 Boylston Street, 150 Federal Street
and One Financial Center in the South Station area.
Founding member of CEDC.
22. Long Bay Management and Development Company. Real estate
development firm. Long Bay general partners, Kenneth
I. Guscott, Cecil H. Guscott, and George R. Guscott.
The entire family is active in many community based
organizations. Long Bay (1) owns and manages 650
multi-family housing units; (2) has developed over 50,000
sq.ft. of commercial, retail and office space; and (3)
acquires vacant land as an investment and basis for future
developments.
23. Kwok Chu Ng. President and owner of the Dragon Chef
restaurants located throughout the Greater Boston Area.
Has served as President of the Eng Suez Sun Association
of Boston. Director of CCBA.
24. Telemat Ltd. Real estate development and management
consulting firm with corporate offices in Chicago, Oakland
and Boston. Owned by Peter C.B. Bynoe. Telemat and
Bynoe are principals in over $500 million of urban mixed
use real estate development.
25. Siew Wong Tso, AIA. President and founder of TSO
Associates, Inc., architects. TSO Associates has been
involved in over 50 public and private sector real estate
development projects with a combined value of over $25
million. TSO Associates has a history of involvement
with Boston's Chinese Community.
26. UNC Ventures. Firms have provided risk capital and related
services to select companies with high revenue and earnings
growth potential. The original entity, UNC Ventdres,
Inc. (formerly Urban National Corporation) was founded
in 1971. The second fund was established in 1983 as
UNC Ventures II, L.P. Both of these venture capital
funds are presently managed by UNC Associates, Inc. UNC
Ventures Funds are specialized, limiting investments
to companies substantially owned by minority business
people. UNC Ventures presently manages over $27 million
of assets. Recently, UNC diversified to invest in two
major real estate developments encompassing 530,000 sq.ft.
of office space valued at $25.7 million.
27. David Shu Ying Wong. Moderator of Chinatown Neighborhood
Council, President and owner of Sun Sun Company, a Boston
grocery importer and wholesaler. Treasurer of the Imperial
Teahouse Restaurant in Boston. Director of the Chinatown
Boys and Girls Club, and CEDC. Member of the South Cove
Nursing Facility Foundation, Inc. and the Kwong Kow
Cultural and Art Association, the Wong Family Association;
CCBA. Trustee of the Oxford Realty Trust and Gow Sue
Wong Trust.
28. Wilson Wai-Man Wong. Works in the family grocery store.
Served as general contractor for 58 Beach Street (Ying
Ying Restaurant). Currently owns and manages the
restaurant. Has invested in numerous restaurants, office
buildings, and residential developments in Chinatown.
29. Davis Woo, P.E. President CCBA, formerly with Dupont
as technical service engineer. Twenty-nine years with
Monsanto Company (chemical manufacturing plant, management
experience). Reputation as a corporate expert in plant
engineering.
30. Cheng Yao. Assistant Vice-President of Factory Mutual
Research Corporation, a non-profit organization supported
in part by a group of the world's largest mutual insurance
companies. Manages the Applied Research Department with
a budget of approximately $5 million. Member of the
Greater Boston Chinese Cultural Association and New England
Chapter of the Organization of Chinese Americans.
31. Philip Yoh, Ph.D. Research staff member at MIT in the
area of communications and space research. Active in
the Greater Boston Chinese Cultural Association and the
Organization of Chinese Americans.
INTERLINK DEVELOPMENT GROUP
I. Team Composition:
1. Frank J. Bispham: Assistant Regional Administrator for
Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Division.
Co-founder and partner in Mattapan Enterprises, a property
rental, sales management and development firm. Fifteen
year Boston resident; member Boston Branch NAACP, Greater
Boston Chamber of Commerce, Black Developers Association
of Boston; Regional Vice-President National Business League.
2. David Blackman: Interlink Chairman. President, Blackman
and Associates. Expertise in engineering management and
industrial engineering. Assistant Dean and Director of
Minority Affairs at Northeastern. BS in Engineering
Management from Boston University and an MS in Engineering
Management from Northeastern.
3. Royal Bolling Jr.: Representative of Ward 14 in Dorchester,
Ward 18 Precinct 3 in Mattapan (6 terms). Vice-Chair
of House Committee on Post Audit and Oversight; served
on House Committee on Rules. One of founders of Mass.
Legislative Black Caucus. Former Chair of Mass. Arson
Commission. Life-long Boston resident.
4. May Chan: Active in development projects in Weston, Natick
and Shrewsbury. Work with Leong Development Co., principal
in large mixed use development on lower Washington Street
in Boston. Member of Board of CCBA. Participant in
CCBA/A.W. Perry joint venture. Member of South Cove YMCA.
Active member of Chinese Cultural Institute and Greater
Boston Chinese Cultural Association.
5. Calvin M. Grimes: President Grimes Oil Co. Affiliations
with NAACP; Chamber of Commerce; Urban League of Boston;
Governor's Committee for Minority Business Development;
One Thousand Committee; American Association of Blacks
in Energy; Dimock Community Health Center; Thrift Fund
for Economic Development. More than 30 years experience
in energy service and training.
6. Ellen Jackson: Dean and Director of Affirmative Action
at Northeastern. Former director Freedom House Institute
on Schools of Education. Former National Executive Director
of the Black Women's Community Development Foundation
Inc. Former contract/project director, State Dept. of
Education. Executive Director of Operation Exodus, the
first black community-based group. Incorporator, Boston
Five Cents Savings Bank. Currently Chairperson Governor's
Community Development Coordinating Council; Trustee, Boston
Plan for Excellence; Board of Freedom House Inc.
Ellen S. Jackson Fellowship in her honor established at
Harvard Graduate School of Education. Ellen S. Jackson
Children's Center at Mission Hill Extension.
7. Diana Lam: Superintendent of District A Schools (Allston,
Brighton, Jamaica Plain, Roxbury, Roslindale). Active
Board member of La Aliana Hispana. During presidency
established Nuestra Communidad and Bohio Development
Corporation. Steering Committee of Strategic Planning,
Conference for Dudley Street Neighborhoods. Honored by
Citywide Bilingual Parents Advisory Council.
8. Allen Miller: Cofounder, partner, Mattapan Enterprises.
Former Assistant to Commissioner in City of Boston
Assessors' Office. Member National Association of Review
Appraisers and Rental Housing Association of Greater Boston
Real Estate Board. Twenty-five year Roxbury and Mattapan
resident. Active in NAACP, Black Developers' Association,
Mattapan Youth Athletic Club.
9. William Overton: Owner, Century Development Company.
Background as entrepreneur, model, actor and advocate
for minority rights. (Husband of Jane Kennedy).
10. Herman Russell: Will be Interlink project manager. Founder
of H.J. Russell & Co., a diversified organization
(construction, real estate, food, beverage and
communications).
General:
e Ms. Jackson, Messrs. Bisphan, Grimes, Miller, Overton, Bolling
and Russell are black; Ms. Chan is Chinese; Ms. Lam is
Hispanic.
* 74% Boston residency, 100% of team works in Boston.
* All members are equal partners; all have made equal
contributions of equity and will share decision making
responsibilities.
APPENDIX E
SUMMARY OF MINORITY DEVELOPMENT TEAM PROPOSALS
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APPENDIX E
MINORITY DEVELOPMENT TEAM PROPOSALS
The minority development team proposals were evaluated on their
ability to fulfill the objectives of the parcel to parcel linkage
project which are:
* Ownership and control of the project equity by non white
developers, including community based organizations;
* Capacity and financial resources to maintain at least a 30%
ownership position in the project;
* Establishment of a mechanism for funding community development;
* Opportunities for at least 30% participation in the stream of
benefits form the project (goods, services and construction
contracts) by Minority Business enterprises;
* Production of affordable housing;
* Creation of jobs, job training programs and child care
facilities;
* Formulation of a development that is compatible with the scale
and density of the surrounding community.
(BRA, Evaluation Summaries for Parcel 18/Kingston-Bedford RFQ
Respondents, March 1987)
The following is a brief summary of the minority development team
proposals with specific focus on job creation, affordable
housing, participation of community based organizations and the
funding of community economic development.
Interlink Development Group
The Interlink Development Group proposes to develop a 20-30
story office tower with 700,000 GSF of office space on the
Kingston-Bedford site above two levels of ground floor commercial
space and a six story 350 room hotel on the Essex Street site
with 5,000 GSF of day care on the roof level. A 600 car
underground garage is included in the Kingston-Bedford plans.
As part of the community benefits package, the Interlink
Development Group proposes to establish a Foundation to receive
10% of the net profit of the operation of the Kingston-Bedford-
Parcel 18 developments to be shared equally between Chinatown and
Roxbury. A community board will be established and comprise two
members of the Interlink Development Group, one representative
from the BRA, two representatives from the CNC and Parcel 18 Task
Force, one representative of the financial community and academic
community respectively. This community board will provide
technical review of the projects and allocate funds for worthy
community development endeavors. 450 units of mixed income
family housing will be built with the linkage fees generated by
the Kingston-Bedford development, state housing assistance such
as SHARP and federal funds. 250 of these units are to be
targeted for the Chinatown area. There are no commitments as to
how many of the Chinatown units will be affordable and the
affordability guidelines, only a promise that "The Foundation
would require long term affordability provision." In addition,
the Interlink Development Group proposes to establish and
administer a Community Housing Fund which will provide grants to
develop small affordable housing projects by CDC's, small for-
profit organizations and individuals. The job creation and
employment training commitment is undeveloped only specifying the
agencies to be used to do job training; Urban Academy and
Northeastern University.
Boston Development Collaborative
The Boston Development Collaborative (BDC) proposes to
develop 750,000 - 900,000 GSF 490 foot office tower with a 500-
600 car underground garage. To fund community development, the
BDC proposes to contribute 10% of the project profits to create
an endowment for a Boston Community Trust Fund to allocate funds
to community organizations. This trust fund will be administered
by a 8 member board of trustees that will include one member each
from the Chinatown Neighborhood Council and the Parcel 18 Task
force. The other members will be selected by the Collaborative -
three will be from Roxbury and three will be from Chinatown.
The BDC proposes to set up an Employment and Job Training
Foundation. It has also set 50% minority and resident
participation in employment opportunities as a target for the two
projects. A low-income housing trust fund will also be created
to provide rent subsidies for both communities and will be
administered by the Board of the Community Trust Fund. The
Boston Development Collaborative has not determined the number of
affordable units to be targeted for Chinatown.
Columbia Plaza Associates
The Columbia Plaza Associates (CPA) proposes a two phase
mixed use development for the Kingston-Bedford site with a total
of 35,000 square foot (SF) retail, 450,000 SF commercial, 200,000
SF hotel and 700 car garage and 150 units of housing to be
developed on scattered sites. In addition to the linkage funds
generated by the projects estimated at $6 million housing linkage
and $1 million job training linkage, CPA will contribute 10% of
the developers fee - approximately 2.5 million, 5% of the annual
net operating income of the Kingston-Bedford development, 10% of
the net proceeds upon refinancing or sale, to a community
development fund. This trust fund will be administered by a
board with representatives from the Chinatown and Roxbury
communities, the BRA, and Columbia Plaza Associates. The
community development fund will fund landbanking, mortgage loans,
bonding assistance for MBE contractors, and venture capital for
retail and commercial projects.
Included in the Columbia Plaza Associates' community
benefits plan is building a prefabricated housing manufacturing
plant that will combine employment creation with building housing
that will provide "an opportunity for families to purchase a home
for under $100,000". A total of 1,945 new construction jobs and
7,760 new permanent jobs are estimated. In addition, the CPA
proposes to build and/or finance 500 units of housing with 400
units being affordable. The CPA also plans to distribute a
significant portion of the housing linkage funds as interest free
downpayment loans to enable residents to purchase homes.
APPENDIX F
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Tabl e I
RACIAL BREAKDOWN
704 705
TOTAL CHINATOWN
AREA
TOTAL PERSONS
WHITE
BLACK
NAT.AM. ,ESK. ,ALEUT
ASIAN & PACIFIC
JAPANESE
CHINESE
FILIPINI
KOREAN
ASIAN INDTAN
VIETNAMESE
HAWATIAN
GUAMANIAN
SAMOAN
OTHER
PER. OF SPAN. ORI.
MEXICAN
PUERTO RICAN
CUBAN
OTHER SPANISH
PERCENTAGE ASIAN
PERCENTAGE CHINESE
TOT. BOS. ASIAN POP.
% BOSTON ASIAN POP.
3552 1821 5361 10734
679 192 2754 3575
167 403 705 1275
5 4 12 21
2712 1094 1366 5172
4 2 2 8
2672 1056 1333 5061
1 4 4 9
3, 1 1 5-I5
1 3
29 27 23 79
22
39
38
6
5
6
21
76.4%.
98.5%
151.50
17.9%
4
129
116
93
23
60. 1
96.5%
7.2%
524
1194
14
106E!
19
93
25.57.
97.6'4
9.0%
4
691
1348
20
1166
25
137
48. 2%
97-9.%
34.1%
SOURCE: U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1980 BnSTON SMSA DATA
702
Table 2
NATIVITY OF RESIDENTS
TOTAL PERSONS
NATIVF
FOREIGN BORN
% NATIVE
% FOREIGN BORN
TOTAL.. CHINATOWN
702 704 705 AREA
2724 1099 1366 5189
641 221 248 1170
2083 818 111 4019
23-57.
76.574
25.6%
7-.4%
18.20 .
81 .8%
22.5%
77.5%
SOURCE: U. S. CENSU IS PUREAU, 19S0 BOSTON SMSA DATA
Table 3
ABILITY TO SPEAK ENGLISH
702 704 705
PERSONS 5-1.7 YPS. 553 256 292
SPK. OTH. ENG. HOME 553 249 292
* BILINGLAL 100.0% 97.3% 100.0%
7. SPK.NO/LIT.ENG 21.2 22.5 9.9
PERSONS 18+ YRS. 1983 777 998
SPK. OTH. ENG. HOME 1963 757 998
7 BTILINGUAL 99.0% 97.4% 100.0%
7 SPK.NO/LIT.ENG 60.2 56.9 55.9
SOURCE: U. S CENSUS BUREAU, 1.90 BOSTON SMSA DATA
Table 4
YERRS OF SCHaGL COMPLETED
TOT.R CHINRrTJWN
702 704 705 AREh
PIR. 25+ YRS. 1654 6J5 793 .300
EiEMENTRY: 0 - 4 YRS. 169 177 826
5 - 7 YRS. 406 136 191
8 YR S. 107 62 53
HCGH SCHOOL:1 - 3 YRS 134 38 106 278
4 YRS 290 168 146 C04
CILLEGE: 1 - 3 YRS. 71 46 796
4+ YRS. 166 -4 41 241
X. 70 T. <8 YRS:'. ELEM. 6!.D2 . 2% 52. 1% 5. 5
%COMP. 4 YS. H IGH SCH. 17. E 25. 7% 10. 4,.19.
%COMP. 4+ YRS. COLLEGE 10.Ci% 5. 2% 5. 7 8
5IURCE: U. .. CENSUS BURERU, 1980 OSTON SMSF [DRTA
Table 5
LABOR FORCE STATUS
TOTAL CHINATOWN
702 704 705 AREA
PERSONS 16+ YRS 2068 821 1054 3943
LABOR FORCE 1364 535 742 2641
% 16+ L.AB.FORCE 66.0% 65.2% 70.4% 67.0%
EMPLOYED 1771 501 706 2478
X EMPLOYED 93.27% 93.6. 95.1.% 93.8%
UNEMPLOYED 93 34 30 157
% UNEMP. 6.8% 6.4% 4.07% 5.9%
MALE 16+ YRS 1049 403 563 2035
LABOR FORCE 815 282 453 1.550
. 16+ LAB.FORCE 77.7% 70.0% 77.7% 76.2%
EMPLOYED 780 265 436 1433
7 EMPLOYED 95.7/. 94.0% 96.70/ 95.7
UNEMPLOYED 35 17 9 61
X UNEMP. 4.3% 6.0. 2.07% 3.9%
FEMALE 16+ YRS 1019 412 471 1908
LABOR FORCE 549 253 289 1091.
7 16+ 53.9% 60.55% 61.4% 57.2.%
EMPLOYED 491 236 268 995
% EMPLOYED 89.4% 93.3. 92.7 91.2.
UNEMPLOYED 58 17 21 96
% UNEMP. 10.6% 6.7% 7.3% 8.87%
W/CHILDREN < 6 YRS 125 54 55 234
IN LABOR FORCE 65 12 17 94
% W/CHILD & WORK 52.00. 22.2% 30.9% 40.27%
MARRIED/HUSB.PRES. 565 267 275 1127
IN LABOR FORCE 349 172 198 719
7 MARRIED & WORK 59.7% 614.4. 72.0% 63.8%
CIVIL.PER. 16-19 YRS. 172 76 110 360
NOT IN SCHOOL 40 15 6 61
NOT H.S. GRAD. 10 5 6 21
EMPLOYED 10 5 15
SOURCE: U. S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1980 BOSTON SMSA DATA
Tatble 6
LfEBOR' FORCE S!TRTJS IN 1379
702 704 705
TOTAL CHINRTOWN
APER
PER!. 16+ LAPa.FOR. '79
% 16+
kOPKED IN 1979
- 16+- WORKED
40+ WEEKS
% 40+
:35+ HRS. /WEEK
% 35+ HRS.
SO-52 WEEKE
% 50-52 WEEKS
:35+ HRS./WEEK
% 35+ HRS.
WITH UNEMP. IN 1979
% LRA. FOR.
UNEMP. 15+ WEEKS
% UNEMP. 15+ WEEKS3
MEAN WEEKS OF UNEMP.
1415 590 845
68. 4% 71.9,% 30. 2 %
1373 576 829
97. 0%., 97. 6-% 9B. 1%
942
66. 6%
799
84. 8 3
616
44. 9;:
532
S6. 4%
259
18. 3:
85
32. %
14.7
:37.1
64.4%
'1 I
85.4%
4:3. 9%
215
85. O0%
145
24. 6%
20. 7%
11.3
539
65. C%
428
79. 4%
355
42. 6%.
i5. 4%
195
23. 1%
El1
41. 5%/
15.9
50URCE: U. 5. CENSUS BUkERU, 1960 BOSTON SrlSA DATA
2850
72. 3.
2776
97. 5%
1852
6. 7%
1544
93. 4%
1224
44. 1%
1050
35. &%
599
21..0%
156
32. 7%
14.0%
OCCJPArIOlDNAL £TTUS:E
Bi:ISTON
702 704 705 CITYWIDE
EMPLOYED 16+ 1271 501 706 7618
PRFE.SINAL/MANAGERIRL 183 44 67 1688
PROF./MANAGERIAL 14.4% 8.6% 9 5%2.
EXEC. ROM. MIANHG. 143 27 55 66d
% EXEC. ROM. MANAL3. 78. 61. 4%e 82. 1 40, 8%'
PROFES. SPECI1)LTTY 40 17 12 1L0ou
X PROFESS. SPECIFILTY 21.9% 38.6% 17.9 9.
TECH. SALES AND ROM. 233 96 146
% TECH. SHLES ANO ADRM. 18. 13.2% 20.7% 24.6
TECHNICIANS 23 9 41 469
SALES 34 16 1? 414
ADM. (INC. CLERICAL) 126 71 681172
X ROM. (INC. CLERICAL) 54.1% 74.0% 60.3% 51. 8
SERVICE OCCUPATIONS 491 207 254 2326
% SERVICE OCCUPATIONS 38.6% 41.3% 41.6% 3C.5%
PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD 6 10 27
PROTECTIVE SERVICE 10 3:
OTHER SERVICE 435 207 274 226 0
FARM. POREST. FISHING 8 22
PREC.PROO.CRAFT & REPAIR 66 26 2221
OPEPAT. FABRICATORS & LABOR 290 126 176 1486
% OPERAT. FABRICATORS & LRBOR 22.6% 25.5 24.9% 19. 5%
MACHINE OPER. ASSEMI. 1NSP. 231 118 166 132?
% MACHINE OPER. ASSEM. INSP 79.7% 92.2% 94.3% 89.3%
TPANSP. & MATERIAL MOVING 14 43
HANDLERS EC. CLEAN. & LABOR 45 10 10 116
SOURCE: U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1980 BOSTON SMSA DATA
Tabl" 7
Table S
INCOME STATUS
702
HOUSEHOLDS
LESS THAN $5000
$5000 TO $7499
$7500 TO $9999
$10000 TO $14999
$15000 TO $19999
$20000 TO $24999
$25000 TO $34999
$35000 TO $49999
$50000 OR MORE
205
182
124
115
54
42
18
25
MEDIAN
MEAN
$9,059
$12, 3 12
X HnuSEHO[LDS < $14999
HOUSEHOLDS W/ EARNINGE
MEAN EARNINGS
WITH SOCIAL SECURITY
MEAN S.S. INC.
W/ PUBLIC ASSIST..
MEAN P.A. INC.
UNRELATED IND. 15+ YRS.-
MEDIAN
MEAN
PER CAPITA INCOME
71.6%
720
$12,946
200
$2,986
1. -Tn
$3,505
$4 ,051 .
$6,135
$4,017
$11,845
$ 13, 065
61.6%
2365
$13, 333
78
$3,059
36
$1, 169
37
$5,167
$5, 766
$13,2 879
$15,288
57-.7%
343
$15,192
64
$3, 036
551
$1,633
125
$3, 580
96256
$4, 429
SOURCE: U. S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1980 BOSTON SMSA DATA
704
276
35
58
141
63
68
4
28
6
705
397
90
4
42
93
71
40
26
25
6
T-3ble -
1979 FAMILY INCOM E IN PERCENT BY 'EIG;HBRciHu
BOSTON NEIGHBOPHOO0 0 - $14,999 $15,000 - $39,*999 40,000 - MOPE
CENTRAL 4 3. 0%-/. 38. 9" 18. 2%
CHINH TOWN 71. 24. 6 3. 8%
Ei A ST BO0ST-ON 51..9% 43, 4',. 4 . 7%
CHARLESTOWN 44. 0Y% 4!.. 7.5%
SOUTH BOSTON 43,0%/ 45. 6. %
BACK BAY-BEACON HILL 18. 7% 41.4 40.0%:
SOUTH END 52.0% 32.2% 7.7%
F ENWA Y-KEN10RE 55. 9% ?9. 1% 1 4
ALLSTON--BR IGHTON 43. 5% 49. 2;: . 4%
JAMAICA PLAI 52. 9; 40. 46
ROXBUR 66.l 1%30J5. 6%.
NOPTH 00OCHESTER 50. 2% 4 4. r2 5. 1%
SOUTH DORCHESTER 45. 3% 47. 5% 7. %
MATTAPAN 51.4% 44.9% 3.7%
POSL INORLE 38. 6% 53. 9: 7.
WEST ')XBJRY 26.% 5i3. 9% 14. 3;:
HYOE PARK 33. 3% 58, 2 B. 4.
S0LIRCE: BRA (1905) "DIUERSITY ANo CHANGE IN BO&SON' Si NEIGH80H000S: 1970-19,0"
Table 10
1979 MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME BY BOSTON NEIGHBORHOUDS
BOSTON NEIGHBORHOOD 1979 FAMILY MEDIAN INCOME
East Boston $14,459
Charlestown $16,938
South Boston $15,318
Central $17,891
Chinatown $10,027
Back Bay-Beacon Hill $32,686
South End $14,571
Fenway-Kenmore $13,412
Allston-Brighton $16,921
Jamaica Plain $14,122
Roxbury $10,773
North Dorchester $14,939
South Dorchester $16,601
Mattapan $14,561
Roslindale $18,760
West Roxbury $23,451
Hyde Park $20,113
SOURCE: BRA (1985) "DIVERSITY AND CHANGE IN BOSTON'S NEIGHBORHOODS"
Table /I
1980 TOTAL POPULATION PERCENTAGE BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN IN THE CITY OF BOSTON,
BY PLANNING DISTRICT
Planning Total White Black American Asian & Other Hispanic
Districts Population Indian, Pacific Origin
Eskimo, Islander
Aleut
East Boston 100.0 98.1 0.4 0.2 0.4 1.0 2.9
Charlestown 100.0 98.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.5 0.9
South Boston 100.0 98.9 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5
Xentral 100.0 79.9 3.0 0.1 16.2 0.9 1.7
Back Bay-Beacon Hill 100.0 92.2 4.3 0.2 2h2 1.2 3.1
South End 100.0 39.3 40.8 0.3 11.9 7.8 12.7
Fenway-Kenmore 100.0 82.4 9.8 0.2 3.8 3.7 4.6
Allston-Brighton 100.0 87.7 4.1 0.1 5.8 2.2 4.5
Jamaica Plain-Parker Hill 100.0 63.8 19.1 0.3 1.7 14.9 19.9
Roxbury 100.0 10.1 77.8 0.4 9.3 11.4 13.3
North Dorchester 100.0 69.4 16.7 0.4 0.7 12.8 12.5
South Dorchester 100.0 66.3 27.9 0.3 0.5 0.5 5.9
Mattapan 100.0- 15.9 80.8 0.4 0.3 2.7 4.6
Roslindale 100.0 92.8 3.8 0.1 1.4 2.0 3.4
West Roxbury 100.0 97.6 0.6 0.0 0.9 0.6 1.3
Hyde Park 100.0 85.6 12.8 0.1 0.6 1.0 1.7
Planning District Totals 100.0 69.9 22.4 0.2 1.7 4.7 6.4
Harbor Islands and 100.0 81.9 14.1 0.6 1.4 2.0 3.3
Crews of Vessels
Boston Total 100.0 70.0 22.4 0.2 2.7 4.7 6.4
*
Race and Hispanic background are determined separately. Hispanics may be of any race.
Source: 1980 Census of Population and Housing: Summary Tape File 14 prepared by
R.S. O'Hara, Jr., Boston Redevelopment Authority ResearchDepartment.
Table /L
YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED BY PERSONS .25 YEARS AND
BY PLANNING DISTRICT, 1980, IN PERCENT
Planning
Districts
Population
Age 25 Yrs.
& Over
Elementary
0-8 Yrs.
High School College
1-3 Yrs. 4 Years 1-3 Yrs 4 Years
Or More
East Boston
Charlestown
South Boston
Central
Back Bay-
Beacon Hill
South End
Fenway-Kenmore
Allston-Brighton
Jamaica Plain
Roxbury
No. Dorchester
So. Dorchester
Mattapan
Roslindale
West Roxbury
Hyde Park.
Planning District
Total
Harbor Islands &
Crews of Vessels
City Total
*
20,823
8,314
.19,403
16,414
19,283
16,567
10,513
37,155
22,786
32,081
13,323
33,684
18,498
20,507
21,860
18,793
330,004
349
330,650
27.9
14.9
20.4
22.7
2.6
21.7
7.9
12.0
18.4
23.3
21.8
15.9
14.3
17.5
9.6
13.4
16.6
6.0
16.6
23.7
21.2
18.0
9.5
3.1
12.3
6.6
9.5
-15-..6-
21.4
18.8
17.9
18.1
13.9
11.2
16.3
14.9
10.9
14.9
36.8
39.0
45.7
21.2
12.9
23.1
22.1
30.3
-29.4
36.0
39.4
42.7
45.1
42.5
41.0
44.9
35.0
30.7
35.0
Totals may not sum exactly to 100.0 percent due to rounding.
Source: 1980 Census of Population and Housing. Summary Tape File 3.
R. S. O'Hara, Jr., Boston Redevelopment Authority Research
6.8
10.2
8.9
12.7
18.9
13.4
22.0
15.3
13-.1
11.3
11.6
12.2
14.3
11.8
16.0
13.9
13.1
6.3
13.1
4.8
14.8
6.9
33.9
62.3
29.5
41.3
33.0
23.6
8.0
8.4
11.2
8.3
13.4
22.3
11.6
20.3
46.1
20.3
Prepared' b
Department.
OVER,
F
Table /3
Planning
Districts
WORKERS IN 1979, BY HOURS WORKED PER WEEK,
IN PERCENT
Usually Worked 35+ Hours per Week
50-52 40-49 27-39 1-26
Weeks Weeks Weeks Weeks
BY NUMBER OF WEEKS WORKED,
Usually Worked
50-52 40-49
Weeks Weeks
1-34 Hours per Week
27-39 1-26
Weeks Weeks
East Boston
Charlestown
South Boston
Central
Back Bay-Beacon Hill
South End
Fenway-Kenmore*
Allston-Brighton
Jamaica Plain
Roxbury
North Dorchester
South Dorchester
Mattapan
Roslindale
West Roxbury
Hyde Park
Planning District
Total
(Sub-total)
Harbor Islands &
Crews of Vessels
(Sub-total)
City Total
(Sub-total)
*
54.5
52.3
57.3
59.4
48.5
54.8
19.3
40.2
46.2
52.3
55.4
53.5
55.3
52.6
56.1
57.4
48.9
9.6
10.5
7.0
10.0
9.6
10.6
8.0
9.2
9.6
10.2
7.8
9.5
10.0
10.0
7.1
8.5
9.2
4.1
5.3
4.3
4.3
5.8
4.6
7.1
6.3
6.2
5.7
4.9
4.4
5.5
4.3
4.3
3.4
5.2
9.8
9.3
8.9
8.5
13.5
9.9
26.1
17.8
13.6
10.3
8.6
8.5
8.4
8.0
8.1
7.2
12.1
8.4
8.9
7.9
5.9
5.1
6.0
7.7
7.6
8.4
7.2
7.7
8,2
713
8.5
9.7
9.4
7.7
3.6
2.8
3.5
3.4
4.7
4.2
7.1
5.5
5.4
3.6
4.2
4.6
3.4
4.1
4.2
2.9
4.5
(75.4)
3.3
49.0
20.3
9.2
14.3
5.2
30.2
(68.1)
12.1
(75.5)
3.3
7.6
0.0
4.5
Planning district totals may not sum exactly to 100.0 percent due to rounding.
Source: 1980 Census of Population and Housing: Summary Tape File 3.
Prepared by R.S. O'Hara, Jr., Boston Redevelopment Authority Research Department.
2.8
3.5
2.6
2.6
4.7
3.1
7.5
4.5
3.5
2.6
3.4
3.2
2.4
3.8
3.5
3.2
3.8
7.2
7.4
8.4
5.9
8.1
6.8
17.3
8.9
7.2
8.2
8.1
8.0
7.8
8.7
7.0
8.0
8.6
(24.6)
28.6
(31.9)
8.6
(24.5)
0.0
3.8
APPENDIX G
DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY PROJECTION OF FASTEST GROWING
OCCUPATIONS FOR BOSTON 1984 - 1995
150
TWENTY-TWO OCCUPATIONS
GENERATING 50 PERCENT OF THE JOB GROWT'H
1984-1995
Net
Change
Salespersons, Retail Trade Services 22,300
Janitors, Porters and Cleaners 17,670
Registered Nurses 16,030
Electrical and Electronic Engineers 14,790
Waiters and Waitresses 14,560
Secretaries 12,450
Cashiers 12,210
Computer Programmers 11,850
Electrical and Electronic Technicians 11,800
Computer Systems Analysts, EDP 11,700
Accountants and Auditors 10,250
Wholesale Trade Sales Workers 10,100
Guards and Doorkeepers 9,590
Nurses Aides and Orderlies 9,200
Fast Food Preparation and Service Workers 8,590
General Office Clerks 8,290
Teachers, Preschool and Elementary 8,110
Kitchen Helpers 7,480
Computer Operators 5,040
Lawyers 5,040
Electrical and Electronic Assemblers 4,410
Automotive Mechanics 4,020
SOURCE: Massachusetts Division of Employment Security, Massachusetts Job
Outlook, Occupational Employment, Projected Changes 1984 to 1995.
The Occupational Projections publication may be obtained by contacting:
Massachusetts Division of Employment Security
Economic Research and Analysis Publications
Charles F. Hurley Bldg., 2nd Flr.
Boston, MA 02114
(617) 727-7434 or 7435
APPENDIX H
ARTICLES ON THE P & L GARMENT WORKERS STRUGGLE
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EIISAMPAN
A Biweekly Pubilication of the Chinese American Civic Association
Unhappy workers assail government with criticism
Jobless garment stitchers hold rally
to voice impatience over delayed aid
Near
& L fa
chers,
conside
around
ment
State H
their i
After
capitol
worker
women
Comm
speake
state fo
benefit
worker
'We
five
neglect
that the
every
by Peter Bagley co-chair of the Workers' Sup-
port Commttee. a group formed
ly six months after the P to generate public support for
ctory closure, jobless stit- the unemployed stitchers.
annoyed by what they P & L Sportswear Company
r a government run- of East Boston yielded to pinch-
in releasing unemploy- ed economic times in the gar-
benefits. rallied on the ment industry and closed its
ouse front steps to voice doors abruptly on December I
mpanence on May 21. last year. laying off 349
marching in front of the workers, many of whom live in
building. about 150 Chinatown.
s, most of them Chinese The state Department of
, converged in the Boston Employment Secunty ordnanly
on to hear a roster of enters the scene in such a case to
rs rail agamst the city and help unemployed workers who
r its delays in producing are displaced through a factory
for the laid off garment shutdown. DES decides the
s amount of unemployment com-
condemn the state for pensation and exarrunes the
months of delay and special requirements of workers
. It shouldn't have to be such as needed job retraining
see women must stnve at
tum." said Sovun Roe. Conrnued on Page 2
2
Adverse economic times ...
Coninuedfrom Page I workforce had dwindled to
base building for the fit-m to 6,700. Figures released by the
mn basud n s t U.S. Department of Commerce
avert factors shutdowns. show a similar erosion of the an-The state Division of EmplOy- dustry and the work force.
Agencies assert
they are providing
help to workers
.r4I
Crowd of formr P & L warars fther is te Bstos Commes to hmgr * m
Changing economics takes its toll
ofganment firms, unions, and workers
Fliers handed out by the
Workers' Support Committee
have portrayed the P & L crisis
as one not only affecting a small
group of jobless stitchers. but
also one impacting a
neighborhood at large.
"Much of an entire communi-
ty will find itself without health
insurance coverage." asserts a
fact sheet produced by the WSC
about tie cnsis.
Although only 200 of the 349
workers laid off by P & L are
Chinese, they are indeed a large
fraction of the women ;n
Chinatown employed in the gar-
ment industry. ,aid to be ].100
h-. one estimate.
And observers can confidently
say that Chinatown, where
women are so concentrated in
ne !ndustrN 133c . will be see-
ng more problems such as the P
& L closure in the ruture
The city's Economic Develop-
ment and Industnal Corporation
has reported a drop in the
number of firms and employees
in the apparel industri for each
year over the past decade.
Between 1977 and !983 the
industry shrank 22 percent. ac-
cording to the EDIC And from
1981 to 1983, 92 firms closed or
moved out of Boston aitogether
About half of them were in
Chinatown.
Small apparel firms were
hardest hit. They have been
forced out of Chinatown by
commerical expansion and
skyrocketing rents.
The biggest intrusionto
Chinatown's garment industry
recently was the move of II gar-
ment companies from Kneeland
Street to the old Army Base
Building 114 in South Boston
from 1982 to 1983.
The city government and
federal government stepped in at
the tme to help rovate the ar-
Conrinued on Page 2
by Peter Bagley
The state and city government
would not budge on providing
unemployment benefits to
former P & L employees. say
some community organizers.
until the garment workers
started raising a raucous
The Workers' Support Com-
mittee for the former P & L gar-
ment workers continues to point
out that when Colonal Provi-
sions Products Company closed
down last year in Roxbury. the
state Department of Employ-
ment Secunty set up a job
retraining program in several
days.
In addition, workers received
two months formal notice before
the plant closure. But at P & L
workers were laid off the same
week of a shutdown notification.
which was initially anticipated
one month away.
"I'm concerned about some ot
the things that have been said."
said Beverly Wing, deputy
director of the Mayor's Office of
Services JCS). of tIe S L
charges against the DES
"Concerning their accusations
that some were dragging their
fee 0 we"ve done mare n two
Connnwd on Page 5
coagramal csabadse 'Mid King m - Goverer D5kaI atP & L rady
Gm wat1r dinm .rise a Sam CAPlas amdinig
ment Security reported that in
1965 about 15,000 workers
were employed in the apparel in-
dustry in Boston. By 1983 the
Imports of inexpensive
clothing and the threat of com-
merical expansion continue to
take their toll of apparel firms
today
While the garmemt firma suf-
fer during this decline, so does
their foe and watchdog, the In-
ternational Ladies Garment
Workers Union (LGWUI, a
one time one of the strongest
unions in the country.
-. e-ase of the amn. -'
the years. the union has become
increasingly powerless.
desperately holding on to its
declining membership.
In Boston the ILGWU has
been acused of turmng down
nraaining programs for the laid
off employees of P & L. rouang
them metead into other garment
industry jobs which have an
uncertain future.
"We have no comm, said
Nathan Sandler, ILGWU
manager in Boston, about the
chage. When asked show
union membership, Sandler
said, "We don't give out any in-
fOrton about the union to
anyone. It's distortd when it's
reeased."
For a union which has Mng
risrepenumon from the Chm se
community, it has been crmiciz-
ed over the years for paying lit-
tle heed to its Chinese
members. In 19g0 when
workers complained that in-
house union pubeiatons did nt
include Cme, Milton Kalan,1
manager of that time, told be
Smpan, "Tbsta's too damn bad
[if they can't read
English. "
The union has blasted against
the Reagan Administration for
not reducing imports and has
osaght many nsuc-essful bat-
d"a to sustamn its conrol over
garment production.
'e union, which galvanized
is support and grew after the
Triangle Shirtwaist Company
fire, which killed 146 garment
workers in New York in 1911.
has men its membership drop 40
percent from 450,000 to
28.000 over the past 15 years.
'The umon complains that the
vilified swetahops of earlier
tims have returned, particularly
in New York's immigrant com-
mumties. Those small Opera-
ions, which provide poorligining and ventilaton. pay
below min..im wage. the IL-
OWU says.
Expenrs my sweatshops, with
low overhead costs, have risen
to memt he challenge of foreign
imports. While garment workers
own mote than their foreign
craftsmen overseas. their
mlariea are still dismal by
Ameria terms - a piecework
wage system can brig in
anywhere from $1 to 59 a hour
for a worker.
Ia the 1950, about 80 percent
of the garment workers were
orgamized In unions Today
labor authormnea s y only 25
percent of garment workers are
organmzed.
P&L Workers
c/o Chinese
27 Beach St
Boston, MA
and Garment Workers Support Committees
Progressive Association
, 3rd floor
02111
UPDATE
The P&L Sportswear Company closed
unemployed nearly 350 workers, mai
three-quarters of Chinese women re
the garment industry, its decline
Boston Chinese community. The sea
earnings restricts average garment
per year, yet this amount provides
to most Chinese immigrant families
also the main source of health ins
since men are frequently employed
which provide no benefits. In the
garment factories, Beverly Rose an
leaving more than 700 workers unem
are expected to shut down in the n
Over the past eleven months, the
win a number of impressive victor
struggles of the Asian community,
groups.
in December of 1985, leaving
nly Chinese women. With nearly
stricted to employment within
poses a grave threat to the
sonal and piecework nature of
worker income to only $4000
a significant share of income
Garment worker employment is
urance for these families,
in nonunionized restaurants
last year two additional
d David.'s, have also closed,
ployed. More garment factories
ear future.
P&L Workers have organized to
ies that are significant for the
workers, women, and minority
- Following the May 21st rally before the
workers won the immediate release of $3
for retraining programs, the extension
benefits, and creation of the Workers'
Boston State House,
50,000 in state funds
of h.ealth insurance
Assistance Center.
- The P&L Workers demanded and won the right to have decision-
making power over the funding, design, and ongoing evaluation
of their language and occupational retraining programs.
- In organizing and building leadership over the past eleven
months, the P&L Workers have brought together the Asian
community in its struggle for both individual empowerment and
community control.
- Their victories have set
mechanism for workers to
decision-making power in
a precedent
secure benef
determining
- In changing the public's percepti
women, P&L Workers have won furth
Asian, and minority groups, in th
for
its,
thei
labor, in creating a
retraining, and
r futures.
on of Chinese
er gains for
eir struggle
immigrant
women,
for equity.
A Garment Worker Portrait
May Ning immigrated with her husband from Hong Kong to Boston in
1980. Not knowing any English, she felt limited in her options and opted to
continue working as a garment worker, a trade she had practiced since the age
of 13. In Hong Kong, garment workers were viewed as skilled laborers, a
stable secure occupation. But in America, May felt, garment workers were
seen as just another low-level occupation for the uneducated. "There is no
respect for garment workers here in America! The emphasis is mainly to
make money, to produce as many pieces of garment as possible to achieve
wealth. Pride in the quality of work no longer plays an important role.
Living depends on the cycles of the garment industry."
When the P&L Sportswear Company shutdown in December, 1985, May
was one of the workers left unemployed. This made living very difficult for
May and her family. Since her immigration to the states in 1980, May had two
children, now age 2 and 5. Typical of many Chinese immigrant families, her
husband is a restuarant worker. The impact of the shutdown made health
insurance inaccessible without help. Her family budget did not permit the
purchase of clothing for her daughters. May had to sew them in her spare
time. The year before the shutdown, May made only $6,000. Her wages had
been declining for several years. She saw no future in the garment industry.
"To stay in the garment industry would be financial suicide."
The city and state were under law to provide retraining for these laid-
off garment workers. When retraining and support services did not come
after five months, May joined the 200 P&L workers to protest the injustice and
delays of the state and city agencies. After a rally at the State House, May said,
"Before this, I would never have thought of getting involved. Now, I see the
importance of coming out to insure justice is done. I can no longer sit quietly,
my family and livelihood is at stake!"
On July 25 the Mayor's Office scheduled a meeting at the Jobs and
Community Service agency to discuss the city's proposal for the retraining of
garment workers left unemployed through plant closings. The city informed
the Garment Workers Support Committee of the meeting and stated that the
unemployed garment workers should not attend. The garment workers,
determined to have some input into the policy making decisions affecting
them, decided to attend the meeting. May felt that it was important and
necessary for them to come. May and many fellow garment workers went to
the meeting, which set the basis for future meetings for the city and workers
to help decide how best to select the most effective retraining programs.
Since then, retraining programs have begun. For May, these
retraining programs are very important. "They will," she said, "help open
doors which had earlier been closed to me." May feels that the Mayor's Office
must maintain an active role along with the garment workers in continuing to
develop and monitor the progress of the retraining programs.
*** Please note - May Ning is fictitious name used to protect the privacy of
the worker.
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